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ABSTRACT
MARCELA VERO´NICA PARADA CONTZEN: Individual Risk Aversion Through The Life Cycle.
(Under the direction of Donna Gilleskie)
This dissertation studies the evolution of individual risk aversion through the life cycle using
observed measures of individual risk aversion coming from survey responses. I develop a dynamic
model of individual lifetime behavior and jointly estimate a set of correlated dynamic equations
for observed risk aversion, wealth-related decisions (employment, occupation, investment, and
savings), and other characteristics that an individual may value independently of wealth (family
and health). I consider how to incorporate observed measures of individual risk aversion into a
dynamic empirical model of individual behavior and how to reconcile the use of these observed
measures with the economic theory of individual behavior over time. In an empirical model that
allows risk preferences (calculated from survey responses) to be an endogenous determinant of
observed behaviors, I find that there is correlation, through unobserved characteristics between
risk aversion and wealth-related behaviors, as well as causal effect of risk preferences on these
outcomes. The joint estimation of observed risk aversion and behaviors reduces the bias on the
estimated marginal effects of endogenous variables that impact wealth-related decisions and better
approximate the distribution of individual unobserved heterogeneity. The estimated model is used to
analyze investment policies associated with wealth accumulation in the Chilean private retirement
system. In this system, each dependent worker must have an individual account where every period
the worker contributes ten percent of her income for accumulating retirement wealth. I evaluate
alternative time-varying default investment schemes showing that, over seven years, slightly riskier
investment strategies may increase individual asset accumulation by eight percent or more. Increases
in mandatory contribution rates by three and five percent generate statistically significant increases
in asset accumulation of 10 and 16 percent, respectively. Finally, when simulating women with
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children who are currently not employed to hold a part-time job, wealth accumulation increases by
10 percent over a seven year time frame.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
This dissertation studies the incorporation of observed measures of individual risk aversion into
an estimable empirical model, and the reconciliation of the use of these observed measures with the
economic theory of behavior over time. Specifically, I compare the estimated marginal effects of
policy variables of interest when these measures are excluded or, exogenously or endogenously,
included in the model. Since risk aversion is an abstract conceptualization based on the properties
of the utility function, economists have developed experimental methods for elicitation of risk
preferences. As a result, there are available observed measures of risk aversion from experimental
settings and from representative surveys.1 The use of these measures in the empirical economics
literature has been increasing in the last 10 to 15 years; however, there is not a generally accepted
way of using them to evaluate the role of risk aversion on individual behavior (Holt and Laury 2014).
Additionally, even when predictions of economic models are well established, there are empirical
limitations that challenge applied researchers. Examples are the typically unaddressed endogeneity
between risk preferences and observed individual behavior and the infrequently studied evolution
of risk aversion through the life cycle (e.g., risk preferences affect individual investment decisions
which affect wealth levels, and accumulation of wealth through the life cycle affects future wealth
and risk preferences).
I develop a dynamic model of individual life-cycle behavior to be reconciled with observed
risk aversion over time. In the model, individual wealth-related decisions depend on risk prefer-
ences. Observed risk aversion is obtained from survey responses and is considered a proxy for
1Chapter 2 presents a review of the conceptualization of risk aversion, empirical methods for elicitation of risk
preferences and the use of these measures in the literature. Examples of surveys with observed measures of risk aversion
are: Panel Study of Income Dynamics (wave of 1996), National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (waves of 1993 and
2002), Health and Retirement Survey (waves 1992, 1994, 1998, 2000, and 2002), Italian Survey of Household Income
and Wealth (1995), German Socio-economic Panel (waves of 2004 and 2006).
an individual’s risk preferences. I model it as a realization of risk attitudes and as an endogenous
determinant of observed individual behaviors. Using the model, I derive a set of estimable correlated
dynamic equations representing wealth-related behaviors such as employment, occupation, savings,
and financial investment decisions. The resulting set of jointly-estimated equations also includes
stochastic health and family characteristics that individuals may value independently of wealth,
and that may affect risk preferences and may be affected by wealth-related decisions. I explore
the role of risk aversion and life expectancy using information from the Chilean Survey of Social
Protection (EPS), unique representative survey data available from Chile, which contains elicited
individual values obtained four times over seven years for every individual in the sample.2 I use
the estimates to analyze policies associated with investment decisions and wealth accumulation in
private retirement systems.
Esta investigacin utiliz informacin de la Encuesta de Proteccin Social. El autor agradece a la
Subsecretara de Previsin Social, propietaria intelectual de la Encuesta, la autorizacin para usar la
Base de Datos Innominada. Todos los resultados del estudio son de responsabilidad del autor y en
nada comprometen a dicha Subsecretara
According to economic theory, an individual is risk averse (loving) if she, starting from a
position of certainty, rejects (accepts) any fair gamble. An individual is said to be risk neutral if she
is indifferent between the options (Meyer 2014). Individuals may be characterized by their degree
of risk aversion. The economics of uncertainty literature defines the level of risk aversion by the
degree of curvature of the utility function, according to the models of Pratt (1964) and Arrow (1965).
An individual’s level of risk aversion is not necessarily constant over time and it may change during
her life cycle. Three effects explain this evolution: changes in wealth levels over the life cycle,
aging, and variation in the length of the planning horizon that individuals consider when making
decisions (Bommier and Rochet 2006).
Based on economists model individual behavior, as risk aversion is manifested in preferences, it
2I thank the Chilean Bureau of Social Security (Subsecretarı´a de Previsio´n Social) for providing the data. The
Chilean Bureau of Social Security is the intellectual owner of the data and it was provided to me unnamed. The results
and conclusions of this dissertation are those of the author and do not indicate concurrence by the Subsecretarı´a de
Previsio´n Social.
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influences all behavioral decisions in settings in which individuals face trade-offs between wealth
and risks. The classic example of the role of risk aversion is in the insurance market. Risk
averse individuals are more likely to buy insurance (e.g., health, car, house, private unemployment
insurance, etc.) and to demand more insurance coverage than risk neutral individuals (Mossin 1968;
Rosen, Tsai, and Downs 2003). Risk aversion also explains individual employment decisions, job
change, and occupation and industry choice (Kihlstrom and Laffont 1979; Guiso and Paiella 2008).
It also impacts saving decisions and wealth accumulation. Depending on her level of risk aversion,
an individual may save more and chose different investment instruments (Gollier 2004).
Empirical measures of risk aversion have been developed and used to explain observed behaviors
(Holt and Laury 2014).3 Some authors have used them to understand what drives differences in
observed behaviors across individuals and to test theoretical predictions. Empirical measures of risk
aversion have also been used to explain wealth-related decisions and outcomes, such as financial and
savings decisions, to analyze retirement wealth accumulation, and to explain individual behavior and
outcomes in the labor market. Risk aversion may play a role in explaining the gender wage gap and
asset accumulation gap, financial investment allocation, entrepreneurship and employment status,
occupation selection, among others.4 Since risk aversion influences many behaviors simultaneously,
it is important to empirically account for the correlation across outcomes. Due to empirical
limitations that I explain later, this has been hard to do. Importantly, by jointly estimating a set of
equations, in this dissertation I account for the correlations between risk preferences and individual
behaviors that affect wealth accumulation through the life cycle.
Empirical measures of risk aversion are also useful for designing public policies. Some authors
suggest that these measures should be used to test whether theoretical assumptions about risk
preferences made in several welfare analyses hold (Harrison, Lau, and Rutstro¨m 2007). Interesting
applications with big impacts are the design of private retirement systems and management of
3Measures of risk aversion are discussed in detail in Chapter 2.
4Some authors that have explored these roles are Johnson and Powell (1994); Schubert, Brown, Gysler, and
Brachinger (1999); Bernasek and Shwiff (2001); Hartog, Ferrer-i Carbonell, and Jonker (2002); Cramer, Hartog, Jonker,
and Van Praag (2002); Eckel and Grossman (2008); Arano, Parker, and Terry (2010); Le, Miller, Slutske, and Martin
(2011); Chakravarty, Harrison, Haruvy, and Rutstro¨m (2011); Nelson (2014).
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pension funds. In a private or contributory pension system, retirement income depends on individual
saving and investment choices through the life cycle. These systems recognize that individual
savings and invest decisions are influenced by one’s level of risk aversion. Therefore, policy design
that accounts for risk preference, its evolution through the life cycle, and its correlation with wealth
accumulation could improve individual welfare and ameliorate retirement income disparity. Some
examples of papers that explore this strand of literature are Bernasek and Shwiff (2001) and Arano
et al. (2010).
Mainly due to empirical limitations, there are still challenges in the literature. First, datasets
tend to be cross sections of information, and the ones that contain measures of risk aversion for the
same individuals over time are scarce. Models of individual economic behavior predict that risk
aversion may vary over the life cycle (Bommier and Rochet 2006). Since longitudinal information
on observed risk aversion is scarce, it has been hard to verify its evolution empirically. The EPS is a
unique dataset that contains observed measures of risk aversion for a representative sample of the
population over time. Second, there is no consensus about how observed measures of risk aversion
should be incorporated into empirical models when measures of observed risk aversion and behavior
are correlated through unobservables. Third, there is a gap in the literature for reconciling observed
measures of risk aversion over time with theoretical models of economic behavior. Additionally,
there is not an accepted way to relate experimental measures of risk aversion (e.g., observed
risk aversion from hypothetical settings coming from survey responses) with observed behaviors
(e.g., savings or investment). These limitations have also resulted in weak evidence on how risk
aversion varies with demographic characteristics. Except for gender and age differences, there is
little conclusive evidence regarding additional sources of individual heterogeneity since most of
this heterogeneity comes from behaviors that are a function of risk preferences. Finally, there are
individual unobserved characteristics and unmodeled factors that likely interact with risk preferences
and affect empirical measures of risk aversion that have not been considered (e.g., the length of the
planning horizon, which influences individuals’ dynamic behaviors).
This dissertation contributes to the literature by addressing these concerns. First, I use four
waves of the EPS, which includes rich information about individual characteristics and questions
4
to elicit individual risk aversion through the life cycle between the years 2002 and 2009 for every
individual. This data feature allows me to account for observed variations in risk aversion over
time while modeling life-cycle decisions that impact wealth accumulation. Second, I reconcile the
use of observed risk aversion with a model of economic behaviors over time. Based on this model,
I explore how elicited risk aversion should be incorporated into empirical models and I compare
the marginal effects of policy variables of interest when observed risk aversion is excluded, or
exogenously or endogenously included. Third, I allow for correlation between elicited risk aversion
coming from hypothetical settings and observed real-life behaviors that depend on individual risk
preferences. I also allow for correlation with other outcomes that an individual may value besides
wealth and I reduce several potential sources of estimation bias by jointly estimating a set of
correlated equations.5 Finally, the paper analyzes wealth accumulation through the life cycle under
different simulated policies in the context of a private retirement system. The analysis is framed in
the setting of the Chilean system, which is one of the oldest ongoing contributory pension systems
in the world and has served as a basis for retirement systems in developing countries. In this paper I
measure the marginal effects of variables that affect investment and savings decisions through the
life cycle, while accounting for risk preferences. Additionally, I provide relevant information for
policy makers who seek to improve retirement income.
The results show that elicited risk aversion and wealth-related behaviors exhibit correlation
through unobservable individual characteristics. Failure to model this correlation results in biased
estimates of parameters of policy interest. By jointly estimating observed risk aversion and behaviors
and outcomes, I reduce the bias on the estimated marginal effects of variables of policy interest and
better approximate the distribution of the remaining individual unobserved heterogeneity. From
5Specifically, the model addresses endogeneity, selection, and measurement error bias. Several theoretically-
relevant explanatory variables for the behaviors or outcomes I model are endogenous. For example, investment vehicles
determine wealth accumulation, yet investment amounts and portfolio allocation (i.e., levels of risk) are chosen by the
individual. Selection bias results from participation behaviors that may be correlated with other modeled behaviors
(e.g., participation in optional savings accounts and earnings). Measurement error might also be present in the survey
measures for subjective assessments as well as reported savings. To address these biases stemming from unobservables,
I use the Discrete Factor Random Effects (DFRE) estimation method, which I describe in Chapter 5, to jointly estimate 22
correlated equations that capture wealth-related behaviors and outcomes, subjective assessments, family characteristics,
and health characteristics.
5
an empirical perspective, observed measures of individual risk assessments provide explanatory
power, yet require using econometric methods that account for unobserved correlation through
non-idiosyncratic avenues. Evidence that the unobserved determinants of observed measures of risk
aversion and individual behaviors and outcomes are correlated suggests that empirical models that
treat observed risk aversion as an exogenous covariate are incorrectly specified.
The simulation results indicate that individuals are accumulating retirement wealth at safe rates
of returns and that the Chilean system’s default investment scheme is an important vehicle for
individual investment choices. I propose alternative time-varying investment schemes and simulate
wealth accumulation under these regimes. I show that slightly riskier investment strategies may
increase asset accumulation by 8 percent or more over seven years, or 1.1 percent per year. This
finding is a substantial result since the wealth gain directly impacts individual retirement wealth
and it continues accumulating over one’s life cycle. Other policy simulations show that increases
in mandatory contribution rates by 3 and 5 percent generate statistically significant increases in
asset accumulation of 10 and 16 percent over the same period of time, or 1.3 and 2.2 percent per
year, respectively. When simulating women with children who are currently not employed to hold a
part-time job, wealth accumulation for those women increase 10 percent over a seven year time
frame. Finally, family characteristics and health status generate statistically significant changes in
asset accumulation. I quantify their contribution to retirement disparity.
The dissertation is divided in eigh chapter. The next chapter reviews the economic concept of
risk aversion, describes the empirical methods for elicitation of risk preferences and the use of these
measures in the applied economics literature. In Chapter 3, I present a dynamic model of individual
life-cycle decisions that reconciles risk preferences with observed risk aversion. I derive the set
of structural, correlated equations to be estimated, and present the estimation strategy. Chapter 4
presents the data and the research sample. The estimation results and discussion about the role
of observed measures of risk aversion in empirical models are presented in Chapter 6. Chapter 7
uses the estimated model to analyze simulated policies associated with wealth accumulation for the
Chilean private retirement system. Finally, Chapter 8 concludes.
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CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW
2.1 Conceptualization of Risk Aversion
The roots of our modern understanding of risk aversion date back to the writing of Bernoulli
in 1738. Its subsequent development was formalized by the contributions of Morgenstern and
Von Neumann in 1953 (Gollier 2004). Pratt (1964) and Arrow (1965) introduced the absolute
and relative measures of risk aversion. These measures rely on the shape of the per-period utility
function in a static setting. They define the coefficient of absolute and relative risk aversion as:
A(ω) = −u′′(ω)
u′(ω) and R(ω) = −ω u
′′(ω)
u′(ω) where u
′(·) and u′′(·) are the first and second derivatives,
respectively, of the per-period utility function, and ω denotes wealth.1
To make optimization problems tractable, researchers often impose assumptions about the
utility function and, hence, about risk aversion. Among all the many classes of utility functions,
a functional form that has received special attention is the constant relative risk aversion (CRRA)
specification. The general representation of this functional form is:
u(ω) =

ω1−ρ
1−ρ if ρ 6= 1
ln(ω) if ρ = 1
(2.1)
where ρ is a constant parameter that is commonly refer to as “the (relative) risk aversion parameter”
or simply “rho.” This representation has been widely used in the economics, psychology, and health
literatures for modeling risk aversion (Wakker 2008). Pratt and Arrow’s static framework restricts
how risk aversion evolves through the life cycle. In this model, risk aversion may change over time
only if the argument (e.g., wealth) of the static utility function changes. Such changes are typically
1It assumes that the utility function captures individual preferences over wealth, and that it is twice continuously
differentiable with a positive first derivative.
assumed to be exogenous.
Bommier and Rochet (2006) expand the analysis by defining an individual intertemporal risk
aversion measure. This measure incorporates the horizon length, or the remaining number of
periods, to study how risk aversion varies during the life cycle.2 In Bommier and Rochet (2006),
the maximal value of the discounted lifetime utility at age n is
Vn(ωn) = max
Cn,...,CN
U(C∗1 , ..., C
∗
n−1, Cn, ..., CN) (2.2)
subject to ωn =
∑N
t=n ptCt, where ωn denotes wealth and pt is the price of a composite good
consumed in period t. Present and future consumption is denoted by (Cn, ..., CN), the optimal
past consumption path by (C∗1 , ..., C
∗
n−1), and N is the horizon length. The dynamic absolute and
relative measures of risk aversion are: ADn (ωn) = −
[
V ′′n (ωn)
V ′n(ωn)
]
and RDn (ωn) = −ωn
[
V ′′n (ωn)
V ′n(ωn)
]
where
V ′n(ωn) and V
′′
n (ωn) are the first and second derivatives of the value function. The dynamic versions
of the absolute and relative measures of risk aversion depends on the shape of the value function, as
well as values of wealth and the number of remaining periods at age n, both of which vary over the
life cycle.
The authors discuss three mechanisms that may impact risk aversion through the life cycle:
wealth, age, and the horizon length. Time t values of wealth not only define risk aversion at the
current period but also determine subsequent values of wealth and hence investment and savings
behaviors. The marginal utility of wealth may change with age, and with the number of remaining
years in one’s decisionmaking problem.
The relationship between individual risk aversion and age described by Bommier and Rochet
(2006) depends on the shape of the utility function. They show that when the lifetime utility
function is a concave transformation of instantaneous utility functions (i.e., the additive separability
assumption), then the dynamic relative risk aversion decreases as age increases. As a generalization,
they show that as one relaxes the additive separability assumption, relative risk aversion also
2They assume that individuals are rational, time consistent, forward-looking, and have preferences over consumption,
that each period an individual behaves in a way that maximizes her lifetime utility subject to her budget constraint, and
that there is no uncertainty.
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decreases with age and there is a larger negative change with respect to the former result for young
individuals (i.e., young individuals are more risk averse when relaxing the assumption).
With respect to wealth, even if relative risk aversion does not change with age, if consumption
changes during the life cycle, risk aversion could vary over time. This is a similar interpretation
to Arrow and Pratt’s original measure, where R(ω) could change over time if there is a change
in the arguments of the utility function (i.e., wealth). Finally, Bommier and Rochet (2006) show
that individual relative risk aversion increases as the horizon length increases. If the individual
faces changes in their horizon length over the life cycle, then it is expected that risk aversion will
change over time. The concavity or convexity of the relationship depends on whether specific
substitutability between consumption levels at different periods of time increases or decreases with
time distance.3
Importantly, if other variables in addition to wealth or consumption, such as leisure or lifestyle
variables, impact utility; then risk aversion also depends on the chosen values of those inputs.
Moreover, since these optimally chosen behaviors are endogenous (i.e., as they are determined by
the optimization of one’s lifetime utility) they also depend on preferences, including risk preferences.
The conceptualization of risk aversion through the rest of this research is based on the extended
dynamic model of Bommier and Rochet (2006). In Chapter 3 develop a dynamic model of individual
lifetime behavior in which I extend the classic notion of risk aversion to be dependent only on
wealth and consumption and allows interaction with other characteristics that an individual may
value independently of wealth such as family or health. The empirical model allows for correlation
in the unobservables that affect risk aversion, horizon length, wealth, and lifestyle characteristics.
2.2 Measures of Risk Aversion in the Empirical Economics Literature
Since Pratt (1964) and Arrow (1965) models of risk aversion, several empirical papers have
attempted to estimate or to elicit individual levels of risk aversion. Empirical methodologies,
contexts, types of data, and results have been quite varied (Eisenhauer and Ventura 2003).
Researchers have used a variety of ways to elicit measures of risk attitude. There are generally
3Specific substitutability depends on the sign of the change in marginal utility of consumption at time t with respect
to time j. That is, 1D2Utj .
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three approaches for measuring risk attitude: the investment portfolio approach, the lottery choice
menu approach, and the pricing task approach (Holt and Laury 2014). The investment portfolio
approach asks respondents to choose between alternative financial gambles. One alternative is
always less risky than the rest. The lottery choice menu builds the individual’s risk attitude based on
a structured list of binary choices between safe and risky gambles. The pricing task approach asks
respondents to name a certainty equivalent money amount for a gamble. Risk attitude is inferred
using this value and the expected value of the gamble. The three approaches are similar since binary
choices in a menu list can be thought of as pairs of alternative portfolios and one can be asked to
elicit a certainty equivalent instead of a price or a choice (Holt and Laury 2014). The survey data
used in this dissertation follows the lottery choice menu approach, using questions that involve
hypothetical gambles over lifetime income.
A different approach is to recover primitive parameters governing an individual’s decision
making process. Barsky, Kimball, Juster, and Shapiro (1995) compute the relative risk aversion
parameter of a CRRA static utility function by directly using survey measures of elicited risk aversion.
They calculate bounds on the relative risk aversion parameter by solving an equation so that the
individual is indifferent between the two options of a hypothetical gamble. Other authors estimate
the relative risk aversion parameter from a CRRA specification without using observed measures
of risk aversion. Rather than directly computing bounds, they parametrized the contemporaneous
utility function, model decisions through the life-cycle, and estimate the risk aversion parameter
rho. This is computationally a more demanding approach. It has the advantage that authors can
study how risk aversion varies as exogenous characteristics change. Some examples of the latter
approach can be found in Keane and Wolpin (2001); Todd and Wolpin (2006); Blau and Gilleskie
(2006, 2008); Van der Klaauw and Wolpin (2008).
There is a connection between measures of risk aversion coming from lottery choice menus
with the conceptualization of risk aversion. These survey answers are viewed as resulting from an
expected utility calculation (Barsky et al. 1995; Spivey 2010). Typically a respondent will be asked:
What do you prefer, a job with a certain lifetime-stable salary or a job where you have p chances
of earning λ1 of your lifetime income or (1 − p) changes of earning λ2 of your lifetime income?
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where λ1 ≥ 1 and 0 < λ2 < 1. The Chilean Survey of Social Protection contains two questions for
elicitation of individual risk preferences. The first questions uses λ1 = 2 and λ2 = 14 . The second
question uses λ1 = 2 and λ2 = 12 .
Assuming U to be the utility function and c permanent consumption (equal to lifetime stable
salary), then the indifference point between options solves:
p× U(λ1c) + (1− p)× U(λ2c) = U(c) (2.3)
Some authors assume a static framework using a CRRA form for U and directly compute the relative
risk aversion parameter by normalizing wealth and consumption, replacing the survey information,
and solving for the indifference rho (Barsky et al. 1995). This is a simplified analysis as it uses a
static model to solve for risk preferences over lifetime consumption and one can only solve for rho
between bounds (i.e., with two questions about preferences toward hypothetical gambles, we end
up with only one computation of rho).
To avoid making assumptions about the functional form of the utility function and about the
evolution of risk aversion over time, rather than following that approach, I categorize risk aversion
based on individual’s answers. The two questions in EPS allow me to construct a 3-category elicited
measure of risk aversion for the four waves, between the years 2002 and 2009.
The individual’s answers to these type of questions depend on both the shape of her utility
function and the argument(s) of the function. For example, even assuming that two individuals’
preferences can be represented by the same utility function, a researcher could observe different
responses between individuals if their wealth levels differ. Empirically, if one can observe measures
of the inputs of the utility function, it is possible to analyze this source of heterogeneity. An individ-
ual’s evaluation of her utility (i.e., point on the utility function) also depends on the individual’s
valuation of the question and potential scenarios. In particular, it may depend on the salary used
for comparing the options. An individual may think of that salary as her current salary. Another
individual may think of that salary as an amount larger than her current salary. A more pessimistic
individual may think of that salary as a low salary. Nevertheless, such variation should not affect
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the risk aversion category assignment because the reference salary used by a particular individual
will be the same for the lottery and for the certain option.
As Barsky et al. (1995) explain, an advantage of this measure of risk aversion is that it is
constructed over the individual’s willingness to gamble using her lifetime income. It avoids the
problem in the existing literature where laboratory experiments with small payouts have little effect
on the individual lifetime resources and therefore it should not exhibit a risk premium. Additionally,
individuals are asked to gamble assuming that they are the only income earners of their households.
This wording eliminates the potential problem that the respondent would be more or less likely to
gamble with her spouse’s income (Spivey 2010).
A critique of this type of measure is that individuals may value their jobs for reasons other
than the pecuniary compensation. In such a case, an individual may pick the safest option because
she does not want to leave her job for some expected income (Barsky et al. 1995; Spivey 2010).
However, this is not what the individual is being asked. The wording of the question does not
assume that the individual is currently working and does not suggest that the safe option is the
individual’s current job. Additionally, no other job characteristics are provided for any of the two
options.
2.3 Elicited Measures of Risk Aversion in the Literature
2.3.1 Risk Aversion and Wealth Accumulation
Elicited measures of risk aversion have been useful in explaining different wealth-related behav-
iors in the economic literature. As a starting point, researchers have attempt to study heterogeneity in
risk aversion between individuals, focusing on exogenous individual characteristics such as gender
or age. Many studies have found that women are more risk averse than men (Grable 2000; Halek
and Eisenhauer 2001; DeLeire and Levy 2001; Grazier and Sloane 2008; Dohmen, Falk, Huffman,
Sunde, Schupp, and Wagner 2005, 2011; Le et al. 2011). However, some other studies have found
mixed results or no gender differences (Harbaugh, Krause, and Vesterlund 2002; Andersen, Harrison,
Lau, and Rutstro¨m 2006; Harrison et al. 2007; Tanaka, Camerer, and Nguyen 2010). Holt and Laury
(2002) find that women are more risk averse than men only in low-payoff conditions. Arano et al.
(2010) find significant differences only between married women and their spouses.
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With respect to age, there is more consistency among results. Harrison et al. (2007) and Dohmen
et al. (2005, 2011) find that willingness to take risks has its maximum among middle-age individuals.
Albert and Duffy (2012) find that young individuals are close to risk neutral while older individuals
are more risk averse.
An important point of interest has been the relationship between individual risk aversion and
labor market outcomes. Some authors have explored the idea that more risk averse individuals are
less likely to be self-employed than to be a dependent worker. This hypothesis suggests that starting
a business naturally entails more risk and earnings variation. There is evidence that supports this idea
(Cramer et al. 2002; Ekelund, Johansson, Ja¨rvelin, and Lichtermann 2005; Brown, Dietrich, Ortiz-
Nun˜ez, and Taylor 2011). Grazier and Sloane (2008) find that workers seem to have preferences
for risky jobs based on family composition and gender, which are assumed to be proxies for risk
aversion. In an attempt to explain the gender wage gap, Le et al. (2011) analyze the role of risk
aversion in explaining wages received. They find that females are more risk averse than males and
that workers with more favorable attitudes towards risk are associated with higher earnings. They
suggest that gender differences in risk attitudes can account for a small part of the standardized
gender pay gap.
In addition, the financial economics literature has used individual investment decisions, such
as observed participation in financial markets and risky asset holdings, as proxies for individual
risk aversion to test the correlation between risk aversion and individual wealth levels. Using six
waves of the Panel Study of Income Dynamics, Brunnermeier and Nagel (2008) test whether wealth
fluctuations generate time-varying risk aversion. They proxy for risk aversion using an individual’s
risky asset share over total investments in the stock market. They find evidence that changes in
liquid wealth have a significant effect on the probability of entering or exiting the stock market but
have little effect on asset allocation for households that already participate in the market. A natural
limitation of Brunnermeier and Nagel (2008) research is that it focuses on one risky behavior, such
as investments in the stock market. There is also a selection issue, since their conclusion is based
only on a sample of individuals who have chosen to participate in the financial market.
Guiso and Paiella (2008) use a cross-sectional dataset on household willingness to pay for a
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hypothetical risky security as an elicited measure of risk aversion and find that absolute risk aversion
is decreasing in individual’s endowment. They reject the CRRA specification as a framework for
explaining lifetime individual risk aversion. Chiappori and Paiella (2011) use longitudinal data on
individual’s wealth invested in risky and safe assets. Using a first difference approach, they test
how changes in wealth affect share of risky assets when time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity is
eliminated. They find that investment in risky assets does not change as financial wealth changes.
This conclusion does not hold as they expand the wealth measure to include business equities
and housing, where investment in risky assets increases as wealth increases. They recover the
distribution of risk aversion for households with risky assets, and they find a negative and significant
correlation between risk aversion and wealth. There is also evidence that past consumption levels
explain current risky asset holdings (Lupton 2003; Ravina 2005).
Sahm (2012) is one of the few authors that uses elicited measures of risk aversion from a
longitudinal dataset. Due to data availability, she focus on individuals over the age of 50. She finds
that changes in household income and wealth, as well as other variables that affect income such as a
serious health condition or job displacement, have little impact on measured risk tolerance. She
also finds that risk tolerance increases with improvement in macroeconomic conditions.
2.3.2 Risk Aversion and Other Individual Behaviors
There is also empirical evidence on the correlation between risk preferences and other charac-
teristics that individuals may value independently of wealth, such as family characteristics, health
status, and cultural backgrounds. However, the results are not informative about the direction of
causality between these variables and risk aversion. Eisenhauer and Ventura (2003) find that risk
aversion is higher among single individuals. Spivey (2010) hypotheses that, due to the uncertainty
in searching for a partner, a more risk averse individual should get married sooner than a less risk
averse individual. Her empirical findings support this idea. Despite some data limitations, she
runs regressions to test for reverse causality and she suggests that being married does not affect an
individual’s risk aversion. There is also evidence that more risk averse individuals are less likely
to divorce (Light and Ahn 2010). Doepke and Tertilt (2016) correlate family structure (marital
status, divorce risks, number of children) with individuals’ and family savings and labor supply
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decisions over time, which we know are affected and affect risk aversion as it impact wealth. They
also recognize the impact that these decisions may have on aggregated savings and labor supply and
how macroeconomic variable may also affect individual’s decisions. With respect to children, the
causality is less clear. Schmidt (2008) finds that more risk averse individuals are more likely to get
married sooner and that more risk averse young woman are more likely have children sooner, yet
the opposite is true for woman at the end of their fertile age. Spivey (2010) finds that individuals
become more risk averse after having children.
Eisenhauer and Ventura (2003) find that individuals with poor health and low education are
more risk averse. There is also evidence that individuals with higher cognitive ability are more
willing to take risks, and that cultural background, such as religion, nationality and migration status,
have an impact on risk taking behavior (Jaeger, Dohmen, Falk, Huffman, Sunde, and Bonin 2010;
Dohmen, Falk, Huffman, and Sunde 2008; Noussair, Trautmann, Van de Kuilen, and Vellekoop
2013; Weber 2013).
2.4 Elicited Risk Aversion in this Research
In this research I analyze the relationship between observed risk aversion and wealth accumula-
tion through an individual’s life cycle. I refer as risk aversion to the curvature of the utility function.
I use the lottery choice menu approach for eliciting individual risk preferences through the life cycle
by using a survey measure in which individuals report preferences toward hypothetical gambles.
I construct a 3-category measure observable 4 times in 7 years (2002-2009) for a representative
survey of the population. I refer to this variable as elicited or observed risk aversion.
I develop a dynamic model of individual lifetime behavior to reconcile the use of these observed
measures with models of economic behavior. In particular, I compare estimated policy variables
when observed risk aversion is excluded from the estimation, or is included assuming endogeneity
or exogeneity to individual decisions. The modeling is based on Bommier and Rochet (2006)’s
model. Observed risk aversion is modeled as a realization at time t of an individual’s dynamic risk
aversion and correlation is allow with an individual’s reported measure of planning horizons.
In the estimable model, I allow correlation between this observed measure of risk aversion with
real life observed behaviors that partially could capture individual’s risk preferences (e.g., financial
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investments). I also allow correlation with other behaviors and outcomes that the literature has used
as proxies for risk aversion, such as health and family structure. I explore the role of permanent
and time varying individual unobserved heterogeneity in wealth-related decisions, survey measures
of risk aversion, and other outcomes related with individual’s health and family characteristics. I
also allow for unobserved components to be correlated between all these observed variables. The
modeling and estimation method in this research addresses estimation bias due to endogeneity and
selection between risk aversion and individual behavior, as well as other sources of bias, such as
measurement error.
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CHAPTER 3
EMPIRICAL MODEL
In this chapter I present a theoretical structural dynamic model of life-cycle decisions and I
derive the set of empirical equations that are jointly estimated. In the model, forward-looking
individuals maximize their discounted expected lifetime utility and make decisions that directly
impact wealth accumulation for retirement through their life cycle. In particular, individuals make
decisions with respect to employment, occupation, investment portfolio for retirement, and savings.
Each period the individual receives utility from consumption and leisure. The model also allow
interaction with other characteristics that an individual may value independently of wealth, such as
family and health characteristics. The objective of the theoretical model is to provide a framework to
study the incorporation of observed measures of risk aversion through the life cycle. Risk aversion
is measure using the dynamic conceptualization of Bommier and Rochet (2006). The curvature
of the lifetime utility function, which depends on the curvature of the per-period utility function,
individual age, and planing horizon, among the other variables, defines an individual level of risk
aversion.
I approximate the choice probabilities as a function of observed and unobserved individual
characteristics. These correspond to reduced form equations derived from the individual dynamic
maximization problem. In the estimable model, two subjective assessments that are determined
simultaneously with the decisions are incorporated: an individual’s reported level of risk aversion
and expected duration of life. The set of empirical equations capture an individual’s decision, which
I call demand functions, as well as these subjective assessments and other characteristics that she
may value independently of wealth (family and health) and may affect an individual’s wealth-related
decisions.
3.1 Timing and Notation
An individual enters each period twith information about her history of past choices and relevant
knowledge about current individual and market characteristics, denoted by the vector Ωt. The choice
history includes accumulated value of assets for retirement (Art ), chosen financial investments for
retirement last period (it−1), optional savings last period (st−1), and work experience up to period t
(Et). Her current characteristics are summarized by marital state (Mt), number of children (Nt),
health status (Ht), individual exogenous characteristics (Xt) (e.g., gender and age), and other
exogenous market-level characteristics (Zt) (e.g., prices). I denote Ω˜t as the set of endogenous
variables influencing the individual’s decision (i.e., Ωt includes Ω˜t, Xt, and Zt).
The retirement system in Chile is based on individual savings and capitalization. It is mandatory
that every dependent worker save ten percent of her employment income. Through this paper I refer
to dependent workers as employed workers, as opposed to self-employed (or independent) workers.
I define wt to be the hourly wage rate and ht hours worked per month. This mandatory saving is
credited to a retirement account that can be liquidated only when the individual retires. Each period
the worker chooses one of five possible investment funds, or a combination of two of those funds, in
which to invest that money. The funds differ by the level of financial risk and are offered by private
firms whose objective is to manage workers’ investments for retirement. The individual makes 5
investment decisions, it = (iAt , i
B
t , i
C
t , i
D
t , i
E
t ), that consist of whether or not to invest in each of the
accounts.1 If an individual is not employed in t but was in the past, she does not contribute to the
account (wt = 0), but she still makes the investment decisions.2
In addition to mandatory savings, individuals may choose to hold voluntary savings (st). These
savings can be cashed at any time, before or after retirement. Therefore an individual’s wealth
entering the period has two components. The first component is the value of accumulated assets
for retirement, Art = A
r
t−1 ·Rrt−1(it−1) + art , which depends on the return of required investments
1Account A invest between 40 and 80 percent in equities; account B 25 and 60 percent; account C 15 and 40
percent; account D 5 and 20 percent; and account E less than 5 percent.
2For a complete description of the system, see Berstein (2010).
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for retirement on previous assets, Rrt−1(it−1), and the worker’s contribution in t− 1, denoted by art .
Rrt−1 is a function of the chosen investments last period, it−1. The second component is the value of
accumulated optional savings, st−1 ·Rot−1 where the return for optional savings is denoted by Rot−1.
When an individual is making the investments and savings decisions, she does not know the rates of
return as they depend on the performance of the financial market. I assume that she observes the
rates of return from the previous period when entering period t.3
At the beginning of each period the individual receives, for each occupation, a wage offer,
w∗t , which is unobserved by the econometrician and drawn from an occupation-specific wage
distribution. She also receives a draw, denoted kt from the medical care consumption distribution
which represents stochastic necessary consumption within the current period. The individual realizes
her level of risk aversion (rt) and forms her expected duration of life (T et ) which are important
for solving the expected utility maximization problem. Simultaneously, the individual decides
her employment state (et), occupation category (ot), investment fund (it), and optional savings
(st). Elicited risk aversion and expected duration of life are realized at the time the individual
faces wealth uncertainty and makes the decisions. The per-period alternatives are et = {0, 1, 2}
indicating non-employed, working part-time, and working full-time, respectively; ot = {1, 2, ..., 6}
indicating occupation categories (elementary occupations; legislators, senior officials and managers,
professionals, technicians and associate professionals; clerical support workers; service and sales
workers; skilled agricultural, forestry and fishery workers, craft and related trade workers; and
plant and machine operators and assemblers); iAt = {0, 1}, iBt = {0, 1}, iCt = {0, 1}, iDt = {0, 1},
iEt = {0, 1}, indicating no investment or investment in that fund, and st = {0, 1} indicating no
optional savings or some optional savings. According to the survey answers that the individual
provides for the hypothetical lotteries, rt takes one of three values, rt = {1, 2, 3} where 1 is the
most risk averse category and 3 is the least risk averse category. Expected duration of life, T et , is
reported in years.
The period t marital status (mt), changes in family size (nt), and health status (Ht) are observed
3These rate of returns are public information and individuals do indeed receive this information.
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entering period t. In order to focus on the role of wealth-related decisions, I assume that their future
values are stochastic outcomes that are realized at the end of each period, prior to entering the next
period. These transitions may depend on the current period decisions, as well as previous behaviors
and outcomes, but are not explicitly modeled as choice variables. For example, health status entering
next period may be a function of current period employment status and health consumption. Past
marriage realizations are summarized by the marital history vector Mt. This vector includes the
marriage state entering the period, mt, number of years married if married, number of marriages,
and interaction terms with gender. Past child realizations are summarized by the child history vector
Nt which include the number of children up to period t, and interaction terms with gender.
After making the period t decisions and subjective assessments, and realizing the period t+ 1
stochastic values, the individual updates her information set to Ωt+1. Figure 3.1 depicts the timing
of endogenous decisions, stochastic realizations and subjective assessments.
Figure 3.1: Timing of Decisions, Subjective Assessments and Stochastic Realizations
t−1︷ ︸︸ ︷ t︷ ︸︸ ︷
Information set
entering period t
(Ωt)
it−1
st−1
Art
Et
Mt
Nt
Ht
Xt
Zt
Draws (wt,kt)
Decisions
& subjective
assessments
et
ht
ot
it
st
T et
rt
Stochastic
realizations
mt+1
nt+1
Ht+1
t+1︷ ︸︸ ︷
Information set
entering period t+ 1
(Ωt+1)
it
st
Art+1
Et+1
Mt+1
Nt+1
Ht+1
Xt+1
Zt+1
20
3.2 Utility Function and Constraints
Each period t the individual receives utility (Ut) from consumption (ct), leisure (lt), marital
status (mt), number of children (Nt), and health status (Ht). The per-period utility function is:
Ut = U (ct, lt;Xt,mt, Nt, Ht, t, r
∗
t ) (3.1)
where t is an alternative-specific preference error and r∗t defines the curvature of the per-period
utility function. Note that consumption and leisure (ct, lt) are endogenous arguments of the utility
function. The marginal utility of these inputs depends on exogenous individual characteristics,
marital status, number of children, and health status.
The individual faces a time constraint and a budget constraint given in equations 3.2 and 3.3.
Total time, Γt, is distributed between leisure, working hours, and family time f(mt, Nt).
An employed individual receives earned income (Yt) equal to wtht, where wt is the hourly
wage and ht denotes hours worked per period. She receives non-earned income from her spouse, if
married (mt). She also receives interest income on previous savings, with rates of returns Rot−1 for
optional savings, and Rrt−1(it−1) for required savings which is a function of the chosen investment
funds. The individual allocates her earnings and wealth between consumption, savings, medical care
consumption expenditures K(kt), and family expenditures g(mt, Nt) each period. More specifically,
Γt = lt + etht + f(mt, Nt) (3.2)
ct + a
r
t + st +K(kt) + g(mt, Nt) = wtht + A
r
t−1R
r
t−1(it−1) + a
r
t−1 + st−1R
o
t−1 +mtYt (3.3)
where st is optional savings, and art defines the required savings each period if a person is employed.
That is
art = αwtht (3.4)
where α represent the fraction of required savings for retirement. Each period, an individual chooses
et, ht, ot, it, and st to maximize remaining lifetime utility given information (Ωt) entering period t
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and her current beliefs about future stochastic outcomes. The individual’s lifetime utility is
T∑
t=1
βt−1U (ct, lt;Xt,mt, Nt, Ht, t, r∗t ) (3.5)
where β is an exogenous discount factor and T represents length of the planning horizon. In the
empirical specification there are four decisions (et, ot, it, st) since hours of work are included in the
categorization for employment et which takes values {0,1,2} for non-employed, working part-time,
and working full-time.
In a static framework, risk aversion would be measured using Pratt (1964) and Arrow (1965).
Risk aversion would depend only on the curvature of the per-period utility function (r∗t ) and
wealth level. In a dynamic setting, an individual’s level of risk aversion may vary over the life-
cycle due to the different mechanisms discussed in Chapter 2.1. Risk aversion depends on the
curvature of the current period utility as well as the curvature of the discounted future utility. In the
empirical framework, I denote rt to be elicited risk aversion and it is modeled as a realization of risk
preferences in a dynamic framework. Elicited risk aversion (rt) is affected by the curvature of the
per-period utility function (r∗t ) and by the curvature of future utility (r
∗
t for t ≥ t+ 1, t+ 2, ..., T ).
Appendix 7.6 presents Pratt (1964)’s and Arrow (1965)’s measures of risk aversion for a static
problem and Bommier and Rochet (2006)’s dynamic measure of risk aversion for a simplified
version of this model with two periods.
3.3 Optimization Problem
Each period t the individual maximizes the present discounted value of her expected lifetime
utility, given her information and beliefs and state variables, and subject to her time and budget
constraints.
The individual dynamic problem is specified as follows. Each period an individual evaluates
her employment alternatives (which include hours of work), occupation, investments, and saving
alternatives. Alternative eois (where et = e, ot = o, iAt = i
A, iBt = i
B, iCt = i
C , iDt = i
D, iEt = i
E ,
st = s) is denoted by deoist = 1. The value of this alternative is the sum of current period utility and
the maximum expected lifetime utility at t+ 1 given the alternative chosen at time t. The instant
utility of choice dt is U eoist . Individuals have expectations over their duration of life. Let T be the
22
final period for an individual. At period t = T the individual cares about her per-period utility and
maximizes equation 3.6.4 That is,
V eoisT (ΩT , T , wT , kT ) = U
eois
T if t = T (3.6)
For all t < T , the individual’s value function (equation 3.7) has two components: the per-period
utility and the discounted maximal expected value of utility at time t+ 1. Specifically,
V eoist (Ωt, t, wt, kt, R
o
t , R
r
t ) = U
eois
t +
β
∫
Rrt+1
∫
Rot+1
∫
wt+1
∫
kt+1
∫
t+1
[
max
eois′
V eois
′
t+1 (Ωt+1, t+1, wt+1, kt+1, R
o
t , R
r
t |dt = eois)
]
dF (t+1)dF (kt+1)dF (wt+1)dF (R
o
t+1)dF (R
r
t+1),
∀t = 1, 2, ..., T − 1
(3.7)
where dF (t+1), dF (kt+1), dF (wt+1), dF (Rot+1), and dF (R
r
t+1) are the probability density func-
tions over the alternative-specific preference error, medical consumption, wages, return on optional
savings, and returns on required savings, respectively.
3.4 Toward an Empirical Framework
3.4.1 Demand Equations
I assume that individuals behave as if they are solving the optimization problem defined in
Chapter 3.3. Individuals optimize with respect to et, ot, it, and st. The solution to this optimization
problem yields eight equations that are functions of individual observed and unobserved (by the
econometrician) information. These demand functions are presented in equations 3.8 to 3.11.
I refer to these equations as demand functions. By solving the system of equations, one can
express each of the demands as a function of the variables contained in Ωt. In order to derive the
4I am assuming no bequest motive. Since the individual values family characteristics and she is making decisions
that affects wealth, an extension of this model could allow for bequest motives.
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estimated set of equations I approximate these demand functions by a Taylor series expansion of its
arguments. Because the behaviors are chosen jointly, they are correlated through common observed
heterogeneity as well as unobserved heterogeneity. For allowing correlation across decision in the
estimation, I decompose the unobserved heterogeneity into three components. These components
are: 1) permanent individual unobserved heterogeneity (µ), 2) time-varying individual unobserved
heterogeneity (νt), and 3) idiosyncratic unobserved heterogeneity (εt). This procedure allows me to
jointly estimate individual decisions and account for estimation biases that are typically present in
the literature of empirical risk aversion.
ln
[
p(et=j)
p(et=0)
]
= ej(it−1, st−1, Art , Et,Mt, Nt, Ht, Xt, Zt, µ, νt)
j = {1, 2}
(3.8)
ln
[
p(ot=j)
p(ot=1)
]
= oj(Et, it−1, Art−1, st−1,Mt, Nt, Ht, Xt, Zt, µ, νt)
j = {2, ..., 6}
(3.9)
ln
[
p(ijt=1)
p(ijt=0)
]
= ij(it−1, st−1, Art , Et,Mt, Nt, Ht, Xt, Zt, µ, νt)
j = {A,B,C,D,E}
(3.10)
ln
[
p(st=1)
p(st=0)
]
= s(it−1, st−1, Art , Et,Mt, Nt, Ht, Xt, Zt, µ, νt) (3.11)
3.4.2 Subjective Assessments
As derived from the optimization problem, we know that the estimable parameters of the set of
correlated equations 3.8 to 3.11 are functions of the primitive parameters of the model, including r∗t
as a component of the per-period utility function. The curvature of the utility function is unobserved
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so in an estimation that does not include measures of risk aversion it is expected to get biased
estimates. Adding elicited measures of risk aversion (rt) into the estimation procedure will result in
approaching the bias from the omitted information. Individual risk aversion could be considered
one of the components of individual unobserved heterogeneity. When observed measures of risk
aversion are not available due to data scarcity, researchers may chose to address this unobserved
characteristics by modeling individual unobserved heterogeneity and consider risk aversion to be
once of the components of it. In this paper, since I am adding observed measures of individual
risk preferences, while modeling unobserved heterogeneity, we gain additional information by
incorporating rt into the model as it may help in identifying the distribution of unobservables. In
Chapter 6 I present the estimates of the model under different structures of individual unobserved
heterogeneity and considering scenarios in which observed measures of risk aversion are not
available. Observed risk aversion is modeled as a realization of the distribution of elicited risk
aversion.
The horizon length has a similar interpretation. An economic model typically assumes that there
are individual preferences and a planning horizon length that rationalizes observed behaviors. In
many applications, the horizon length of the lifetime optimization problem is assumed to be some
fixed number. In this model the individual’s horizon length T defines the dynamic optimization
problem and affects the primitive parameters of the model. Additionally, from Bommier and Rochet
(2006) we know that the horizon length is one of the determinants of the individual’s dynamic risk
aversion. We may also consider T as the horizon length that affects the individual valuation of the
hypothetical gambles over their lifetime income, used to construct rt. Since T is unobserved we can
use the individual reported expected duration of life, T et , as a proxy. The individual may change
her expectation of duration of life as she faces different scenarios (for instance, the individual may
report a different level of expected duration of life in one wave after facing a health shock). T et is a
realization of the value that rationalizes her decisions and it is included into the set of equations
as an assessment that is jointly realized with elicited risk aversion. Similarly, its incorporation
reduces the bias due to omitted information and it may also help in identifying the distribution of
unobservables.
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Based on the above discussion, the preferred model treats the two subjective assessments as
jointly realized with the observed wealth related decisions (i.e., at the moment the individual faces
the uncertainty). This modeling assumption implies that rt and T et can be expressed as functions
of variables contained in Ωt as well as the permanent and time-variant unobserved components.
The two subjective assessments are defined in equations 3.12 and 3.13. I also try other modeling
assumptions in which current and lagged period subjective assessments are used as explanatory
variables of decisions. These specifications are discussed in detail in Chapter 6.
T et = T
e(it−1, st−1, Art , Et,Mt, Nt, Ht, Xt, Zt, 
T
t , µ, νt) (3.12)
ln
[
p(rt=j)
p(rt=1)
]
= rj(it−1, st−1, Art , Et,Mt, Nt, Ht, Xt, Ztµ, νt)
j = {2, 3}
(3.13)
3.4.3 Stochastic Outcomes
At period t there is uncertainty about elements of the next period recursive value function,
specifically, about future stochastic outcomes: wage draw, future marital status, number of children,
health care consumption and health status. I assume that the individual does not know these future
values, but she does know the stochastic process. These outcomes are not modeled as decision as
in this model individuals make decisions with respect to variables that affect wealth. I allow the
realization of these values to be affected by previous choices as well by decisions at period t. The
objective of incorporating family and health characteristics is to extend the classic notion of risk
aversion to be a function exclusively of wealth, and allowing interaction with other characteristics
that individuals may value independently of their effect on wealth. Additionally, since family and
health characteristics are variables that the literature have used as proxies for risk aversion, in
this paper I estimate the correlation across risk aversion and these outcomes. These densities and
probability functions are presented in equations 3.14 to 3.18.
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The density of wages is a function of work experience, occupation category, health status, and
other individual’s exogenous individual characteristics, such as age, gender and education. It also
depends on a vector of employment demand side shifters, ZEt such as unemployment rates.
wt = w(Et, ot, Ht, Xt, Z
E
t , 
w
t ) (3.14)
where wt is an uncorrelated error term. The probability of being not married in period t + 1
(mt+1 = 0) relative to being married (mt+1 = 1) is given in equation 3.15. The probabilistic
dichotomous event depends on endogenous and exogenous individual characteristics. While not
modeled explicitly, I assume that there is a marriage market such that supply side factors, ZMt ,
also impact marriage probability. Supply side factors may include the number of marriages in the
population of each gender or by other characteristics.
ln
[
p(mt+1 = 1)
p(mt+1 = 0)
]
= m(dt, Ω˜t, Xt, Z
M
t ) (3.15)
The probability of decreasing or increasing the number of children in period t + 1 (nt+1 =
{−1, 1}) relative to not (nt+1 = 0) is defined in equation 3.16 and depends on endogenous and
exogenous individual characteristics, and exogenous supply side factors.
ln
[
p(nt+1 = j)
p(nt+1 = 0)
]
= nj(dt, Ω˜t, Xt, Z
N
t ), j = {−1, 1} (3.16)
The density function at period t + 1 of health consumption, measured by the number of medical
visits, is a function of endogenous and exogenous individual characteristics, and supply side factors
such as medical care prices and insurance coverage, ZKt .
kt+1 = k(dt, Ω˜t, Xt, Z
K
t , 
k
t ) (3.17)
where kt is an uncorrelated error term. The probability of being in health status j in period t+ 1
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(Ht+1 = j where j = {2, 3, 4} represent categories good, regular, and poor respectively) relative to
being in a very good health status (Ht+1 = 1) is
ln
[
p(Ht+1 = j)
p(Ht+1 = 1)
]
= Hj(Ht, kt, et, ot, Xt, Z
H
t ), j = {2, 3, 4} (3.18)
and depends on current health and medical care consumption which represents medical care
inputs. The period t employment and occupation choice, as well as other individual exogenous
characteristics, also impact health transitions. Employment behavior may directly affect health or
may proxy for omitted non-medical care inputs such as nutrition and exercise.
The stochastic outcomes defined in equations 3.14 to 3.18 are jointly estimated with the observed
behaviors and subjective assessments in equations 3.8 to 3.13. I allow correlation across all
fifteen equations through theoretically-relevant observed variables, and permanent and time-varying
individual unobserved heterogeneity. Note that many of these decisions and outcomes can be
thought as proxies for risk aversion.5
Returns on required, Rrt , and optional, R
o
t , savings are stochastic and exogenous to the individual
as they depend on financial markets. These returns vary by investment fund and not by individual
(e.g., two individuals investing in account A accumulate wealth at the same rate of return) Retirement
wealth evolves according to equation 3.19.
Art+1 = A
r
t ·Rrt (it) + art (3.19)
5The literature has used occupation categories, investment decisions, family characteristics, among others, as
indirect measures of an individual’s risk aversion.
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CHAPTER 4
DATA AND RESEARCH SAMPLE
The main source of data are the first 4 waves of the EPS (Encuesta de Proteccio´n Social).
This survey is an individual longitudinal dataset for the years 2002, 2004, 2006, and 2009. It is
administered by the Ministry of Labor and Social Security in Chile jointly with the University of
Chile and the Institute for Social Research from the University of Michigan (Ministerio del Trabajo
y de Prevision Social 2011). I complement the EPS with administrative data from the Chilean
Superintendence of Pensions (Superintendencia de Pensiones).
The EPS 2002 was designed to obtain a representative sample of individuals who are affiliated
with the Chilean retirement system. Beginning in 2004, the EPS is a representative sample of the
entire adult population since the sample was extended to include those individuals who are not
affiliated with the retirement program (i.e., any individual who has not worked as a dependent
worker for at least one month since 1981). Table 4.1 presents the total sample size for each wave of
the survey.
An important feature of the EPS is that it provides information about individual preferences over
hypothetical gambles. A measure of risk aversion for every individual aged 15 years-old and above
can be created from this information, and it is measured every wave.
Table 4.1: Sample Size in EPS
2002 2004 2006 2009
Interviews 17,246 16,994 16,752 14,920
Dead∗ 937 267 309 457
Observations 16,309 16,727 16,443 14,463
Note: (a) *The sample was designed so that it is representa-
tive of all the individuals who were ever affiliated with the
private retirement system between the years 1981 and 2001.
Therefore dead individuals are included in the reference pop-
ulation for the design of the first wave. Dead individuals are
also included in the second, third, and fourth wave if the sur-
vey year immediately follows a death. Their corresponding
questions where answered by a family member.
4.1 Description of Elicited Measure of Risk Aversion
Elicited risk aversion can be derived from a set of questions in the EPS that require respondents
to report preferences toward hypothetical gambles over their lifetime income following the lottery
choice menu approach. Appendix B.1 presents the survey questions that allow one to obtain the
measures for elicited risk aversion and discusses in detail how the measure is constructed. The
questions are slightly different in the first wave, but the same in waves 2, 3, and 4. However, since
some hypothetical scenarios are the same for all waves, it is possible to construct a comparable risk
attitude measure at each wave.
Respondents are separated into three distinct risk preference categories. Depending on the
option that the individual accepts, she is more or less risk averse than another individual. The three
categories takes values 1, 2, and 3, and are labeled “most risk averse,” “intermediate risk aversion,”
and “least risk averse.”
Table 4.2 presents the distribution of the index of risk aversion for the whole sample. A majority
(78%) of individuals belong to the most risk averse category.
An specific strong advantage of EPS is that it contains the same questions to elicit risk aversion
asked to a representative sample of the population, for the same individuals, and over 7 years.
Databases with these characteristics are not common in the economics literature. This allows to
analyze risk aversion through the life cycle and to approach typically unmodeled factors. This study
additionally allows correlation between this elicited measure of risk aversion constructed based
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Table 4.2: Distribution of Elicited Risk Aversion for the Whole Sample
Elicited Risk Aversion 2002 2004 2006 2009 Total
Most Risk Averse 14,604 12,099 11,258 9,545 47,506
(category = 1) (90.25%) (74.42%) (74.22%) (74.02%) (78.52%)
Intermediate 377 1,142 1,194 1,073 3,786
(category = 2) (2.33%) (7.02%) (7.87%) (8.32%) (6.26%)
Least Risk Averse 1,201 3,016 2,716 2,278 9,211
(category = 3) (7.42%) (18.55%) (17.91%) (17.66%) (15.22%)
Observations 16,182 16,257 15,168 12,896 60,503
Note: (a) Elicited Risk Aversion goes from 1 to 3, being 1 the highest level of risk aversion. This
measure was constructed using two questions about preferences over hypothetical lotteries in the
four waves of EPS. (b) The whole sample is used. (c) Elicited risk aversion from the first wave
does not enter the estimation for the preferred model.
on hypothetical scenarios with real-life decisions that may also reflect an individual’s level of risk
aversion.
4.2 Description of Research Sample
The research sample used in the estimation consists of all individuals aged between 25 and
59 years old (limits included) in 2002 who are observed in all four waves of EPS (no attrition nor
deaths) and who have no missing information for the variables: health status, optional savings, work
experience, marital status, and region of residence. The research sample contains 7,168 individuals
observed four times (28,672 person-year observations). Table 4.3 details determination of the
research sample. Table 4.4 presents summary statistics describing the demographics of the reference
sample (individuals observed more than one period and in age range) and the research sample. The
average age and percent of female are similar across the two samples. There is a higher share of
individuals in the lower education category in the research sample than in the reference sample.
Table 4.5 describes the dependent variables for the 15 equation set. The number of observations
differs per equations as individuals may have missing information in some dependent variable(s). I
assume that this missing information is random. Table 4.6 describes the explanatory variable used
in estimation, entering period t.
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Table 4.3: Construction of Research Sample
Sample # Individuals
Reference sample
Age between 25 and 59 years old in 2002∗ 13,178
And observed in 3 consecutive periods
First three waves 8,545
Last three waves 8,869
And no attrition no death
Observed in all four waves∗∗ 7,238
And Information available for key variables
Research Sample∗∗∗ 7,168
Note: (a) ∗ Individuals who show up more than one period. ∗∗ Death rates
are small for individuals aged between 25 and 59 years old in 2002. ∗∗∗
No missing information in the following variables: health status, optional
savings decisions, work experience, marital status, and region of residence.
(b) The variables are defined in detail in Appendix B.2.
Table 4.4: Summary Statistics for Demographic Variables Between Reference and Research Sample
(2002)
Variable Reference Sample Research Sample
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Age 40.633 9.461 40.715 9.275
Female 0.497 0.500 0.462 0.499
Education category
Less than High School 0.413 0.492 0.531 0.499
High School 0.259 0.438 0.285 0.452
Technical College 0.104 0.305 0.109 0.311
College or Post College 0.067 0.250 0.065 0.247
Missing 0.158 0.365 0.010 0.098
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Table 4.5: Summary Statistics of Dependent Variables for Research Sample
Variable Estimator Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Employment (et) mlogit 21,504
Full-time employed 0.690 0.462 0 1
Part-time employed 0.031 0.174 0 1
Not working 0.278 0.448 0 1
Occupation (ot) (if working) mlogit 15,327
Elementary occupations 0.219 0.414 0 1
Legis., Prof., Tech., other 0.185 0.388 0 1
Clerical support workers 0.107 0.309 0 1
Service and sales workers 0.147 0.354 0 1
Agricultural, craft and trade 0.057 0.231 0 1
Operators and assemblers. 0.286 0.452 0 1
Investment (it) logit 21,504
Account A (Riskier) 0.104 0.305 0 1
Account B 0.231 0.422 0 1
Account C 0.495 0.500 0 1
Account D 0.215 0.411 0 1
Account E (Safest) 0.037 0.189 0 1
Savings outcomes (st) logit 21,490
Any Optional Savings 0.263 0.441 0 1
Expected Duration OLS 75.780 10.091 30 110 17,287
of Life (T et )
Elicited Risk Aversion (rt) mlogit 20,557
Most Risk Averse 0.747 0.435 0 1
Intermediate Risk Averse 0.076 0.265 0 1
Least Risk Averse 0.177 0.381 0 1
Log of wage (wt) OLS 0.657 1.440 -10.219 5.255 14,705
Marital status (mt+1) logit 21,504
Married 0.571 0.495 0 1
Variation in number mlogit 21,060
of children (nt+1)
No change 0.788 0.408 0 1
Decrease 0.184 0.387 0 1
Increase 0.028 0.165 0 1
Medical consumption (kt+1) OLS 21,438
Number of Medical Visits 6.697 12.639 0 240
Health status (Ht+1) mlogit 14,336
Very good 0.147 0.354 0 1
Good 0.519 0.500 0 1
Regular 0.266 0.442 0 1
Poor 0.068 0.252 0 1
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Table 4.6: Summary Statistics of Explanatory Variables Entering Period t for Research Sample
(continues)
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Work experience (years) 15.646 8.111 0 30
Employment Status at period t
Full-time Worker 0.691 0.462 0 1
Part-time Worker 0.032 0.177 0 1
Not employed 0.277 0.447 0 1
Occupation Category in period t
Elementary occupations 0.117 0.322 0 1
Legis., Prof., Tech., other 0.099 0.298 0 1
Clerical support workers 0.057 0.232 0 1
Service and sales workers 0.078 0.269 0 1
Agricultural, craft and trade, other 0.030 0.172 0 1
Operators and assemblers 0.153 0.360 0 1
Lagged Investment Decision
Account A (Riskier) 0.059 0.235 0 1
Account B 0.135 0.341 0 1
Account C 0.495 0.500 0 1
Account D 0.095 0.293 0 1
Account E (Safest) 0.021 0.144 0 1
Value of Assets 5.906 12.487 0 242
Any Optional Savings 0.218 0.413 0 1
Married 0.569 0.495 0 1
Duration of marriage (years) 11.444 12.626 0 56
Number of Children 1.009 1.083 0 8
Number of Medical Visits in period t 5.007 11.31 0 240
Health Status
Very Good 0.139 0.346 0 1
Good 0.536 0.499 0 1
Fair 0.266 0.442 0 1
Poor 0.059 0.236 0 1
Age 43.965 9.628 25 66
Female 0.462 0.499 0 1
Education Category
Less than High School 0.536 0.499 0 1
High School 0.334 0.472 0 1
Technical College 0.097 0.296 0 1
College and Post-Graduate 0.025 0.156 0 1
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(continuation) Summary Statistics of Explanatory Variables Entering Period t for Research Sample
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Exclusion Restrictions
Unemployment rate 9.226 2.261 4.200 15.000
Hospital beds (# per 1,000 population) 2.345 0.373 1.300 3.900
Number of doctors (# per 1,000 population) 0.978 0.220 0.580 1.870
Number of marriages (# year per 1,000 population) 3.486 0.437 2.500 5.100
Inches of rainfall (thousand inches per year) 17.501 13.705 0.000 65.450
College tuition (thousand dollars) 3.240 0.641 0.000 4.300
Missing Indicators
Missing: Number of Children 0.021 0.142 0 1
Missing: Education 0.007 0.082 0 1
Missing: Occupation 0.261 0.439 0 1
Missing: Marriage Duration 0.005 0.069 0 1
Missing: Number of Medical Visits 0.252 0.434 0 1
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CHAPTER 5
ESTIMATION STRATEGY
5.1 Initial Conditions
Because individuals are aged 25 to 59 years old when they are first observed in 2002, some
of the state variables that explain endogenous behavior are non-zero. However, I cannot use a
dynamic equation (i.e., all that depends on past values) to estimate this initially-observed variation.
Thus, I model the initial conditions as static equations (i.e., initial employment status, initial work
experience, initial occupation category, initial savings decision, initial marital status, initial number
of children, and initial health status.) All of them are modeled as a function of exogenous individual
and market characteristics, and are jointly estimated with the rest of the equations by allowing the
initial conditions to be correlated through individual permanent unobserved heterogeneity.
Exogenous individual characteristics for initial employment status, initial work experience, and
initial occupation category include age, gender, education, parent’s years of schooling, interaction
terms between gender and parent’s education, self-reported socioeconomic status of household when
growing up. Market characteristics include the vector ZI = (ZEI , Z
M
I , Z
N
I , Z
K
I , Z
H
I ). The same
individual characteristics are included for initial health status, which depends also on characteristics
of the health market include ZKI and Z
H
I . Exogenous individual characteristics for initial marital
status and initial number of children include age, gender, education, parent’s education, interaction
terms between gender and parent’s education, socioeconomic status of household and number of
children in household when growing up. Characteristics of the marriage market for initial marital
status and characteristics of the children market for initial number of children are included (ZMI or
ZNI , respectively).
5.2 Estimation Method
The set of estimated equations consists of 22 equations: 8 demand behaviors, 2 subjective as-
sessments, 5 stochastic outcomes, and 7 initial conditions. The demand, assessments and outcomes
are correlated through permanent and time-varying unobserved heterogeneity while the initial condi-
tions equations are correlated through the permanent component. I refer to this type of unobserved
heterogeienty as correlated unobserved heterogeneity (CUH). It represents an individual’s charac-
teristics and attitudes that are unobserved by the econometrician and that affect simultaneously an
individual’s behavior and observed outcomes. There is a third source of unobserved heterogeneity
that comes from the idiosyncratic component of the error term in each equation.
As mentioned, the joint estimation of this set of equations allowing for the correlated individual
unobserved heterogeneity accounts for different sources of estimation bias that the literature typically
does not approach. I also estimate the model under alternative modeling assumptions for the
correlated unobserved heterogeneity. The details of these specifications are presented in Chapter 6.
These equations are estimated using the Discrete Factor Random Effects (DFRE) method. The
DFRE method does not impose distributional assumptions over the correlated error terms across
equations. Rather, the support of the unobserved heterogeneity distribution is discretized and the
mass point locations as well as their probabilities are estimated jointly with parameters on the
observed heterogeneity in each equation (Mroz and Guilkey 1992; Mroz 1999). The DFRE method
perform as well as maximum likelihood estimation assuming normality when the true distribution
of the error term is jointly normal. When the distribution is not normal, the DFRE performs better
both in precision and bias (Mroz 1999).
It is assumed that the error in each demand, subjective assessment, and stochastic outcome
equation has the form:
zt = µ
z + νzt + ε
z
t , z = {1, ..., 15} (5.1)
and that the error in each initial condition equations has the form:
zit = µ
zi + εzit , zi = {1, ..., 7} (5.2)
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where z represents the per-period equation, zi the initial conditions equation, µ captures permanent
correlated unobserved heterogeneity and νt captures correlated time-varying unobserved heterogene-
ity. The third component, εt, is an independently and identically distributed source of individual
unobserved heterogeneity.
The advantage of the DFRE method in this setting is that it allows us to estimate the decisions
and observed outcomes derived from the individual’s optimization problem without assuming
specific functional forms for the utility function, constraints, and expectation processes, and without
assuming any specific distributional form for the correlated error terms. Importantly, it does not
impose any assumption on the individual’s risk preferences. Additionally, it allows for both the
permanent and time-varying correlatd unobserved components in a flexible way. Moreover, this
method allows us to account for, among other unobserved factors, measurement error in endogenous
variables as one of the components of the modeled individual unobserved heterogeneity.
5.3 Identification
The identification of the set of equations relies on various sources. First, identification comes
from the exclusion of certain explanatory variables from each outcome equation. Assumptions
regarding the timing of decision-making in the individual’s optimization problem allow for the
exclusion of particular variables from particular equations. Theory suggests that the pre-determined
variables and exogenous price and supply-related variables enter the behavioral equations. Some
of these variables are excluded from the outcome equations. For instance, I assume that medical
care decisions are made after the main behaviors and their associated prices are realized. Thus, I
condition medical care expenditures on the observed period t behaviors, and assume that the supply
side variables that determined the behaviors do not have an independent effect of medical care
expenditures.
The vector of prices and supply-side variables that serve as the identifying variables in the
behavioral equations, Zt = (ZEt , Z
M
t , Z
N
t , Z
K
t , Z
H
t ), include theoretically relevant market level
supply-side factors that affects individual decisions, such as unemployment rates, health market
characteristics, marriage market characteristics, and costs associated to family (e.g., tuition prices).
Zt enters the information set Ωt at the beginning of period t and affects all individual demands
38
and subjective assessments (equation 3.8 to equation 3.13). The coefficients on these included
variables are jointly significant at a 1 percent level in equations 3.8–3.13 (p-values < 0.0003 for
the joint significance Wald tests). For equation 3.10 (outcome j = D) the included variables are
jointly significant at a 10 percent level (p-value = 0.0539 for the joint significance Wald test). The
exception is equation 3.10 (outcome j = B) for which the joint insignificance of the coefficients
cannot be rejected (p-value = 0.1203 for Wald test). The detail is presented in Table C.1.
Additionally, the dynamic specification of wealth-related decisions and subjective assessments
include lagged endogenous variables that are functions of market-level exogenous variables (e.g.,
the vector Zt−1 is included in explaining decisions at period t−1) such that the history of exogenous
variables provides another source of exogenous variation (Arellano and Bond 1991). I test the sig-
nificance of lagged exogenous market characteristics in period t behavior and subjective assessment
equations by adding them to the equation specification one at a time and re-estimating the model.
Most of the coefficients on the lagged Zs are insignificant in explaining period t decisions and
assessments, conditional on Zt. The detail is presented in Table C.2.
For the stochastic outcomes (equation 3.14 to equation 3.18), conditional on the behavior at
period t, only the a subset of Zt that directly affects the outcome of interest enters into the probability
function. For instance, conditional on the observed behavior in t, only characteristics of the marriage
market (ZMt ) affect the probability of being married next period. For each stochastic outcome, I
have an equation-specific set of exclusion restrictions denoted by ZEt , Z
M
t , Z
N
t , Z
K
t , or Z
H
t . In
equation 3.17 for medical consumption I include a specific vector ZKt which exclude 4 variables
from the vector Zt. The variables included in ZKt capture medical care market characteristics such
as number of medical doctors and hospital beds by geographical region. ZKt is excluded from the
health status equation at the end of period t as health at t is a function (among other variables)
of medical consumption at period t, health status at t− 1, and its own vector ZHt . I run separate
regressions by adding the excluded variables one by one in equations 3.17 and 3.18. For equation
3.17, the coefficients on the excluded variables in ZEt and Z
H
t are insignificant (p-values of 0.6290
and 0.1510, respectively) supporting the exclusion. The coefficients on the variables in ZMt and Z
N
t
are significant at a 1 percent level. For equation 3.18 one variable in ZKt is significant at a 1 percent
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level and the other one is insignificant (p-value = 0.2157).
Identification also comes from the functional form assumption on the distribution of the id-
iosyncratic component of the error term in each equation (εzi and ε
z
t ) and from the restriction on the
number of factors allowed for approximating the distribution of correlated individual unobserved
heterogeneity.
5.4 Likelihood Function
The likelihood function conditional to the correlated individual unobserved heterogeneity is
given by equation 5.3.
Lct(µ, νt) = fw(
W
t |µ, νt)fk(Kt |µ, νt)
J∏
j
{
Pr
(
I(djt = d
j)|µ, νt
)
fj(
j
t |µ, νt)
}I(djt=dj) (5.3)
where djt represents a choice, j = {E,O, IA, IB, IC , ID, IE, S, T e, R,M,N,H}, f(·) represents
the density function of the error term of each equation, Pr(·) is the cumulative distribution function
for each choice, and I(djt = dj) is an indicator of a particular choice.
The likelihood function unconditional to the correlated individual unobserved heterogeneity is
given by equation 5.4.
Lt =
Q∑
q=1
PWµq
R∑
r=1
PWνr
T∏
t=1
Lct(µ, νt) (5.4)
where PWµq is the probability of observing q mass points for the permanent component µ and
PWνr is the probability of observing r mass points for the time-varying component νt. These
approximate the true distributions of µ and νt.
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CHAPTER 6
ESTIMATION RESULTS
In this chapter I present the estimation results and model fit for the dynamic model presented in
Chapter 3, which accounts for both permanent and time-varying correlated individual unobserved
heterogeneity. I compare these results with a simpler model that does not account for the correlation
across equations. Finally, in order to analyze how survey measures should be used and the infor-
mation that they add, I present the results of alternative specifications of the model with different
structures of correlated unobserved heterogeneity and different assumptions about the exogeneity of
the subjective assessments
6.1 Preferred Model: Empirical Specification and Parameter Estimates
Table 6.1 presents the empirical specification for the preferred model which joint estimates the
15 equations and Table 6.2 for the 7 initial condition equations. A model that does not allow for
correlation across equations estimates each of the 22 equation separately. Not matter the correlation
structure that is allowed across equations, there is always individual unobserved heterogeneity
defined by an independent random error in each equation. I refer to the jointly estimated model
as model with correlated unobserved heterogeneity (CUH) and the model that does not allow for
correlation across equations as the model without correlated unobserved heterogeneity (no CUH).
Tables C.3-C.11 presents the estimated coefficients for the per-period equations.1
The estimation results for investment decisions equations for required retirement savings show
that the estimated coefficients on work experience and its square have a statistically significant effect
on some of the investment decisions, especially for the safest accounts. For most of the investment
decisions the estimated coefficient on the value of accumulated assets at the time of making
1Estimates for the initial conditions equations and the model without CUH are available from the author. The
preferred model allows for four permanent and four time-varying mass points for capturing the distribution of CUH.
the decision and the coefficients on investment decisions in the previous period are statistically
significant, particularly when the individual invested in that same fund. This suggests that there
is a persistence effect. These results are consistent with other results discussed in the retirement
literature (Hastings, Hortac¸su, and Syverson 2013; Luco 2015). The estimated parameters on health
status and family characteristics are also statistically significant.
Table C.7 presents the estimation results for the subjective assessments. Most of the coefficients
for the endogenous explanatory variables are statistically insignificant, while the coefficients that
capture unobserved characteristics are statistically significant. In order to further explore these
results I examine the correlation across subjective assessments, decisions and outcomes of the
model. Using the estimated mass points and probability weights from the joint distribution of
unobservable characteristic I compute the Pearson’s correlation coefficients which is presented in
Table C.12. There is correlation across both, the permanent and time-variant components of the
subjective assessments and decisions and outcomes of the model. This suggests that researchers
should account for the correlation across outcomes when measures of elicited risk aversion are
included.
For both categories of elicited risk aversion there is correlation with occupational categories, in
particular in the component that captures permanent unobserved heterogeneity. Least risk averse
individuals are also more likely to be employed as legislators, senior officials, managers, profession-
als, and technicians, and in service and sales occupations; and less likely to be in skilled agricultural,
forestry and fishery, craft and trade occupations, than the intermediate risk averse individuals. There
is correlation between employment status and expected duration of life, negative for the permanent
component and positive for the time-varying component. Unobservable characteristics for individ-
uals in the least risk averse category are positive correlated with unobservable in investments in
accounts A, and B (permanent); and negatively correlated with accounts B (time-variant), C, D, E.
There is also correlation with savings, medical care consumption, health, and family characteristics.
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6.2 Fit of the Model
Table 6.3 presents the summary of the observed and simulated behavior. The simulated values are
obtained using observed values of explanatory variables, with no updating of current endogenous
behaviors in response to past behaviors and outcomes, and with 100 replications for the types
probabilities. The standard errors are calculated using predictions based on 100 draws of the
estimated coefficients from the estimated variance-covariance matrix.
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Table 6.3: Summary of Fit of the Model
Outcome Observed Simulated
Mean St. Error Mean St. Error
Employment
Full-time employed 0.690 0.462 0.695 0.159
Part-time employed 0.031 0.174 0.033 0.191
Not working 0.278 0.448 0.272 0.128
Occupation
Elementary occupations 0.219 0.414 0.248 0.093
Legis., Prof., Tech., other 0.185 0.388 0.174 0.131
Clerical support workers 0.107 0.309 0.096 0.126
Service and sales workers 0.147 0.354 0.144 0.193
Agricultural, craft and trade 0.057 0.231 0.069 0.128
Operators and assemblers. 0.286 0.452 0.270 0.209
Investments
Account A (Riskier) 0.104 0.305 0.104 0.070
Account B 0.231 0.422 0.223 0.083
Account C 0.495 0.500 0.512 0.064
Account D 0.215 0.411 0.207 0.065
Account E (Safest) 0.037 0.189 0.038 0.050
Optional Savings 0.263 0.440 0.262 0.121
Expected Duration of Life 75.780 10.091 75.775 2.347
Elicited Risk Aversion
Most Risk Averse 0.747 0.435 0.747 0.175
Intermediate Risk Averse 0.076 0.265 0.076 0.141
Least Risk Averse 0.177 0.381 0.176 0.155
Log of Wage 0.657 1.440 0.534 0.154
Marital status (married) 0.571 0.495 0.575 0.028
Variation in number of children
No change 0.788 0.408 0.784 0.052
Decrease 0.184 0.387 0.184 0.043
Increase 0.028 0.165 0.032 0.035
Medical consumption 6.697 12.639 6.681 1.564
Health status
Very good 0.147 0.354 0.145 0.046
Good 0.519 0.500 0.521 0.157
Regular 0.266 0.442 0.268 0.179
Poor 0.068 0.252 0.066 0.141
Note: (a) Simulated values are obtained using observed values of explanatory variables,
with no updating of current endogenous behaviors in response to past behaviors and
outcomes, and with 100 replications for the types probabilities. (b) Bootstrapped
standard errors are calculated using 100 repetitions.
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6.3 Contemporaneous Marginal Effects
In this chapter I compare estimated marginal effects for the models with and without CUH. Table
6.4 presents the contemporaneous marginal effects (model with no updating of current endogenous
behaviors in response to past behaviors and outcomes) computed at the observed values for lagged
decisions in holding optional savings and investment in the 5 alternatives of financial accounts,
and for increases of one unit in work experience, age, and accumulated assets. Standard errors are
calculated using predictions based on 100 draws of the estimated coefficients from the estimated
variance-covariance matrix.
We can expect the marginal effects of the model without CUH to be biased. On one hand, the
reduced form estimated coefficients of the demand equations are a function of risk preferences and
the individual planning horizon as they are derived from the individual’s optimization problem.
Additionally, from the conceptualization of risk aversion presented in Chapter 2, risk aversion and
horizon length are jointly determined. Empirically, observed risk aversion and expected duration
of life are jointly determined with wealth-related behaviors. Finally, allowing correlation across
equations allows to reduce the bias due to the measurement error that might be present in subjective
assessments reported in survey measures.
When comparing both models, one can observe that the significance of the marginal effects
changes when estimating the model with and without correlated unobserved heterogeneity. Addi-
tionally, most of the marginal effects between the two models are statistical different. This suggests
that accounting for correlation across outcomes adds information for identifying the coefficients of
interest. Importantly, the preferred model allows us to recover marginal effects after accounting
for unobserved characteristics and by including subjective assessments to better approximate the
its distribution. For accounts B, C, and D, lagged investment in the accounts have a statistically
significant effect in explaining this period investment decision. The same is observed for optional
savings.
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Table 6.4: Contemporaneous Marginal Effects on Financial Investment and Savings Outcomes for
Preferred Model With and Without Correlation Across Equations (%) (continues)
Variable Current Period Decisions
Investment in A Investment in B Investment in C
CUH No CUH CUH No CUH With CUH No CUH
Lagged
Investment A 13.821a 19.404∗ 0.204a 0.029 -3.071∗∗∗a -6.848∗∗∗
(8.577) (11.008) (1.785) (1.835) (0.208) (2.230)
Investment B 0.759a 1.508 15.839∗∗∗a 14.277∗ -7.980∗∗∗a -4.747∗∗
(1.254) (2.445) (3.315) (7.329) (0.675) (2.137)
Investment C 1.768a 2.936 3.590∗∗a 2.110 6.623∗∗∗a 7.366∗∗∗
(2.437) (3.490) (2.170) (2.860) (0.804) (2.793)
Investment D -0.193a 0.814 3.972a 1.903 -11.844∗∗∗a -7.052∗∗∗
(2.117) (3.025) (2.499) (3.848) (1.297) (2.620)
Investment E 2.368a 4.419 6.347∗∗a 5.017 -0.800a 1.022
(3.053) (10.362) (3.383) (8.809) (1.415) (7.344)
Savings 1.094a 1.442 0.218a 0.360 -0.763∗∗∗a -0.478
(1.272) (1.739) (0.477) (0.773) (0.243) (0.392)
Experience -0.312a -0.463 0.099a 0.210 1.436∗∗∗a 1.315∗∗∗
(0.373) (0.827) (0.152) (0.337) (0.119) (0.268)
Age -0.096a -0.294 -1.721∗∗∗a -2.048∗∗∗ -0.484∗∗∗a 0.066
(0.084) (0.333) (0.195) (0.671) (0.099) (0.094)
Assets 0.045a 0.109 0.136∗∗∗a 0.141∗∗ 0.016a -0.035
(0.044) (0.095) (0.034) (0.068) (0.022) (0.025)
Note: (a) Marginal effects computed at the observed values. (b) Model with no updating of current
endogenous behaviors in response to past behaviors and outcomes. (c) Simulated with 100 repetitions.
(d) Bootstrapped standard errors are in parentheses using with 100 draws. (e) CUH refers to correlated
individual unobserved heterogeneity.
∗ Significant at the 10 percent level. ∗∗ Significant at the 5 percent level. ∗∗∗ Significant at the 1 percent
level.
a,b,c Difference in means test between model with and without unobserved heterogeneity significant at
the 1, 5, and 10 percent level, respectively.
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(continuation) Contemporaneous Marginal Effects on Financial Investment and Savings Outcomes
for Preferred Model With and Without Correlation Across Equations (%)
Variable Current Period Decisions
Investment in D Investment in E Savings
CUH No CUH CUH No CUH With CUH No CUH
Lagged
Investment A -0.385a -1.032 -1.382a -1.183 3.787∗∗a 4.221
(1.506) (2.062) (1.589) (1.442) (1.645) (5.082)
Investment B 0.716a -0.373 0.047a 0.096 2.120a 2.332
(1.239) (1.945) (1.348) (1.611) (1.337) (4.669)
Investment C -1.127a -1.945 0.136a 0.181 3.278∗∗ 3.281
(1.685) (2.557) (1.491) (1.203) (1.582) (4.417)
Investment D 10.057∗∗∗a 5.749∗ -0.339a -0.539 2.555a 2.506
(3.328) (3.271) (1.492) (4.779) (2.106) (5.543)
Investment E -1.972a -3.503 7.145a 7.332 2.246a 1.869
(2.152) (3.924) (5.654) (7.690) (2.512) (10.884)
Savings -0.805∗a -0.857 -0.163a -0.236 16.237∗∗∗a 16.793∗∗∗
(0.429) (0.822) (0.622) (0.692) (3.787) (4.546)
Experience -0.862∗∗∗a -0.475∗∗ -0.016 -0.014 0.407a 0.441
(0.172) (0.223) (0.137) (0.261) (0.375) (0.321)
Age 2.022∗∗∗a 2.110∗∗∗ 0.030a 0.037 -0.527∗∗∗a -0.599∗∗∗
(0.144) (0.286) (0.026) (0.372) (0.127) (0.167)
Assets -0.057∗∗∗a -0.091∗∗ 0.027a 0.021 0.104∗∗∗a 0.119∗∗∗
(0.018) (0.040) (0.030) (0.050) (0.031) (0.043)
Note: (a) Marginal effects computed at the observed values. (b) Model with no updating of current
endogenous behaviors in response to past behaviors and outcomes. (c) Simulated with 100 repetitions.
(d) Bootstrapped standard errors are in parentheses using with 100 draws. (e) CUH refers to correlated
individual unobserved heterogeneity.
∗ Significant at the 10 percent level. ∗∗ Significant at the 5 percent level. ∗∗∗ Significant at the 1 percent
level.
a,b,c Difference in means test between model with and without unobserved heterogeneity significant at
the 1, 5, and 10 percent level, respectively.
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6.4 Alternative Specifications of the Model
One of the objectives of this dissertation is to study the incorporation of observed measures of
individual risk aversion. For that, I first developed a dynamic model of individual that justifies the
incorporation and role of observed risk aversion in the estimation of reduced form parameters.
In this section, I compare estimated marginal effects under different specifications of the model.
These specifications capture the different assumptions that one made when including observed
measures of risk aversion. In particular, I compare estimated marginal effects of variables that
impact investment decisions for retirement when observed measures of risk aversion are excluded
from the estimation, which is what most study face due to data scarcity. I also compare these
estimated marginal effects when observed risk aversion is included as a additional covariate in
investment decisions equations, which assumes that risk aversion is exogenous to wealth related
decisions. This is an approach that the literature on empirical risk aversion has follow. In this
section, I analyze if there are differences in the estimation when assuming exogeneity versus jointly
modeling observed risk aversion.
Additionally, to explore the additional information that survey measures on subjective assess-
ments add to empirical models and how they should be used, I estimate alternative specifications of
the model under different structures of correlated unobserved heterogeneity. Correlated unobserved
heterogeneity takes three forms: no unobserved heterogeneity, just permanent unobserved hetero-
geneity, and both permanent and time-variant unobserved heterogeneity. An independent random
error is always included.
The specifications for the subjective assumptions are: jointly determined, exogenous to decisions
and as explanatory variables, and predetermined (lagged subjective assessments) as explanatory
variables. The objective is to disentangle the role that the estimation structure and assumptions on
assessments have on the marginal effects of interest. I focus on the effect on the marginal effect of
lagged investment decisions on this period investment and savings decisions. The summary of the
alternative versions of the model are presented in Table 6.5.
Model 1 is considered as a basic comparison framework of a model for explaining behaviors.
The coefficients on this model are expected to be biased as assessments do not play a role on the
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Table 6.5: Alternative Specifications of the Model
Correlated Unobserved Subjective
Heterogeneity (CUH) Assessments
Permanent Time-Variant
Model 1 No No Included: Not Jointly
Model 2 Yes No Not included
Model 3 Yes Yes Not included
Model 4 Yes No Included: Jointly
Model 5* Yes Yes Included: Jointly
Model 6 No No Included: RHS
Model 7 Yes No Included: RHS
Model 8 Yes Yes Included: RHS
Model 9 Yes No Included: Jointly and Lagged RHS
Model 10 Yes Yes Included: Jointly and Lagged RHS
Note: (a) CUH refers to correlated individual unobserved heterogeneity. (b) Jointly =
subjective assessments at time t are jointly estimated with the decisions and outcomes,
allowing correlation across equations according to the structure assumed on permanent
and time-variant unobserved heterogeneity. (c) RHS = subjective assessments at time t
are assumed to be exogenous and included as explanatory variables for wealth-related
decisions at time t. (d) Lagged RHS = subjective assessments at time t− 1 are included as
explanatory variables for wealth-related decisions at time t. (e) * Model 5 corresponds to
the preferred model developed in Chapter 3.
investment decision equations. Model 5 corresponds to the preferred model developed in Chapter 3
which reconciles observed subjective assessments with a model of economic behavior over time.
Model 4 assumes the same specification for assessments and does not allow for time-varying CUH.
The purpose is to test whether the structure on the CUH plays a role after including subjective
assessments into the estimation. Models 6-8 assumes that subjective assessments are exogenous
to decisions and outcomes and are used as additional explanatory variables. These models are
compared with Models 1-5 to analyze the impact of the modeling assumptions on assessments on
the coefficients of interest. Models 9-10 assumes that predetermined assessments explain wealth
decisions and the results are compared to models 6-8 to test the effect of assuming exogeneity of
current period assessments.
Tables C.13, C.14, and C.15 specified the set of equations estimated in each model, the corre-
lation allowed across equations if any, the empirical specification of exogenous and endogenous
explanatory variables, and the probability weights for the CUH components. Table C.16 presents the
complete point contemporaneous marginal effects of lagged investment decisions on this period
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investment and savings decisions and the test for differences between marginal effects for the 10
models with respect to the preferred. The parameters estimates for all equations and models and the
information for the test for differences in means for every model are available from the author.
Incorporation of observed measures of risk aversion: Most of the marginal effects for lagged
investment decisions are statistically different when comparing models 1, 2, and 3. These models
are estimated as if measures on elicited risk aversion and expected duration of life are not available.
Accounting for permanent and time-variant CUH is important in these simply specifications. As
well, most of the marginal effects are statistically different when comparing the preferred model 5
with models 1 and 4, which assume different structure for the CUH. This suggests that including
subjective assessments and controlling for CUH (preferred model) reduces the estimation bias. This
is expected as elicited risk aversion and expected duration of life is correlated with the decisions,
affects the primitives of the model, and helps to approximate the distribution of the remaining
unobserved heterogeneity. The same role is found for the two alternative specifications for the
subjective assessments (model 8 compared with model 6 and 7, and model 10 compared with model
9).
Exogeneity assumption: The assumptions on the exogeneity of subjective assessments to
wealth-related decisions should be an important consideration in modeling elicited risk aversion.
From the conceptualization of risk aversion we that that it is a strong assumption to use elicited
measures of risk aversion as exogenous explanatory variables. Empirically, I found that observed
risk aversion exhibit correlation with decisions and outcomes and that the marginal effects are
substantively different between model 5, model 8, and model 10. Model 10 relaxes the exogeneity
assumption by using predetermined elicited risk aversion as explanatory variables. When longitudi-
nal measures of risk aversion are available this could be a solution to avoid the previous assumption.
However one needs to be careful about the interpretation as the conceptualization of dynamic risk
aversion does not suggest that predetermined (lagged) risk aversion directly affects this periods
decisions. It rather suggest that lagged risk aversion affected lagged decisions and those decisions
affected this periods decisions.
The next chapter analyzes counterfactual policy simulations associated with wealth accumulation
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for retirement based on the Chilean retirement system using the preferred model developed in
Chapter 2.4. This model has the advantage of reconciling the use of observed measures of risk
aversion with a dynamic model of economic behavior without making exogeneity assumptions.
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CHAPTER 7
SIMULATION RESULTS: WEALTH ACCUMULATION UNDER DIFFERENT POLICY
SIMULATIONS IN THE CHILEAN PRIVATE RETIREMENT SYSTEM
This chapter studies retirement-wealth accumulation under several simulated scenarios in
the context of the Chilean private retirement system. The system is based on individual private
capitalization and it was introduced in 1981 to replace the old pay-as-you-go pension system
managed by the state. In the new system, each dependent worker must have an individual account
where every period the worker contributes 10 percent of her wage. Individuals savings are capitalized
and managed by private companies known as Pension Fund Administrators (AFPs for their name in
Spanish, “Administradoras de Fondos de Pensiones”). Every period, the AFPs invest the workers’
savings in the financial market based on investment decisions made by the workers. The worker
can choose one of five possible investment funds (accounts A, B, C, D, or E), or a combination of
two of these funds (e.g., half in account A and half in account B). These funds differ by the level of
financial risk, which is measure as the fraction of investment on equities. Account A is the riskier
one while account E is the safest one. Account A invest between a 40 and 80 percent in equities;
Account B 25 and 60 percent; Account C 15 and 40 percent; Account D 5 and 20 percent; and
Account E less than 5 percent. These investment accounts are offered by private firms whose sole
objective is to manage workers investments for retirement and whose profits are protected from
financial risks.
Contributors naturally face a financial risk in their savings accounts. It is expected that riskier
accounts will generate a higher financial return, while the fluctuations in returns is also expected to
be higher. The system desing assumes that individuals make financial decisions over their life cycle
that match their level of risk aversion. There is a system’s default investment scheme that depends
on individual exogenous characteristics and that is applied to individuals who do not explicitly
chose financial funds. Table 7.1 presents the characteristics of the default investment scheme.
As shown in Chapter 6, the incorporation of observed measures of individual risk aversion
is relevant when identifying the magnitude of the coefficients and marginal effects that explain
investment decisions. In this chapter, I use the model developed in Chapter 3 as the data-generating
process for simulating policies and behaviors for 7 years. The simulated outcomes are used to
update next period’s endogenous explanatory variables. Each individual is replicated 100 times
allowing draws from the unobserved heterogeneity distribution. Every individual enters the first
period with their initial observed characteristics, except when otherwise specified. As a baseline for
comparison, unless other specified, I use the simulated behaviors and outcomes of 100 replications
of each individual, where the updating goes according to the estimated model. I use a yearly model,
assuming that individuals save a 10 percent of their annual wage (except when other specified), and
accumulating assets at the annualized mean-real rate of return of investment funds for the periods
October of 2002 to December of 2009. For each simulation, I compute the percentage change in
accumulated assets with respect to the baseline simulation at the end of the 7th period.
In this chapter I present the results from these simulations. Chapter 7.1 presents the simulations
results on wealth accumulation under different policies of default investment schemes and evaluates
the importance of incorporating access to financial instruments in retirement systems. In Chapter
7.2, I analyze wealth accumulation under increases in the mandatory contribution rate from 10
percent to 11, 13, 15 and 20 percent. In Chapter , I present the impact on wealth accumulation for
retirement of increasing part-time employment among women. Finally, in chapters 7.4 and 7.5, I
present the effect that family and health characteristics have on asset accumulation for retirement.
7.1 Different Investment Paths
Table 7.2 presents the percent change in accumulated assets at the end of the 7th year under
different investment paths with respect to the default. The advantages of default investment schemes
in retirement systems have been documented in the literature. Individuals are more likely to
participate in savings programs when default schemes are suggested.1 The participation in the
Chilean retirement system is mandatory for workers in the formal sector, so rather that focusing
1Some authors that explore this are: Madrian and Shea (2001), Carroll, Choi, Laibson, Madrian, and Metrick
(2009), Choi, Laibson, and Madrian (2011), and Luco (2015).
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on the participation effects of default schemes, I compare five investment strategies. I propose two
alternative time-varying default investment schemes and I evaluate the wealth gains or loses of
changing the current default. The schemes evaluated are: (1) baseline which is predicted by the
model, (2) the riskier default adds one level of financial risk to the system default following the same
trajectory (e.g., if the default suggest B, the riskier default uses A); (3) the riskier gender-equated
is financially more aggressive for young individuals than the current system’s default and equates
conditions between men and women; (4) the all C in which every individual invests in account C
every period (no multi-accounts); and (5) the all E in which every individual invests in account E
every period (i.e., risk-free return). Table 7.1 presents in detail the investment strategy for each
simulation and Table 7.2 presents the results.
Individuals are getting statistically the same retirement wealth than if they follow the system’s
default path. This is expected as the default is under a “opt out” regime since its implementation
and it is consistent with the discussion with respect to the importance of default schemes (Madrian
and Shea 2001; Thaler 2016). The riskier default and the riskier gender-equated strategies generate
statistically significant increases in asset accumulation, with means of 8.07 and 8.39 percent
respectively (1.11 and 1.16 percent real per year, respectively). This is the effect of holding
riskier financial positions through the life-cycle. These are substantial results since the wealth
gain directly impacts individuals welfare through retirement income. When simulating the no
multi-accounts option, at the mean, individuals would get an statistical significant increase in asset
accumulation of 1.10 percent. These are interesting results. Individuals are on average investing
in safe instruments and their returns are similar to what the default regime generates. This again
recognizes the importance of adjusting the current default scheme. For the last simulation, I do not
allow individuals to invest in risky financial investments. The percent loss of asset accumulation if
everyone receives the risk-free return is significant and substantial (12.76 percent in 7 years, or 1.73
percent real per year). The effect is bigger as one moves forward in the asset distribution. This result
confirms the importance of allowing access to financial instruments for retirement investments in
retirement systems.
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Table 7.1: Investments Paths for Retirement Asset Accumulation Simulations
Investment Path Portfolio Composition
Investment Men Women
System’s Default Account A — —
Account B age≤ 35 age≤ 35
Account C 36 ≤ age ≤ 55 36 ≤ age ≤ 50
Account D age≥ 56 age≥ 51
Account E — —
Riskier Default Account A age≤ 35 age≤ 35
Account B 36 ≤ age ≤ 55 36 ≤ age ≤ 50
Account C age≥ 56 age≥ 51
Account D — —
Account E — —
Riskier Gender-Equated Account A age≤ 45 age≤ 45
Account B 46 ≤ age ≤ 55 46 ≤ age ≤ 55
Account C 56 ≤ age ≤ 60 56 ≤ age ≤ 60
Account D age≥ 61 age≥ 61
Account E — —
All C Account A — —
(no multi-accounts) Account B — —
Account C all ages all ages
Account D — —
Account E — —
All E Account A — —
(risk-free return) Account B — —
Account C — —
Account D — —
Account E all ages all ages
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Table 7.2: Effect of Investment Path Through the Life Cycle: Percentage Change in Accumulated
Assets at the End of Seven Years under Simulated Life-Cycle Investment Paths
Investment Paths
Predicted Riskier Riskier All C All E
by Model Default Gender-Equated
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Mean 0.02 8.07∗∗∗ 8.39∗∗∗ 1.10∗∗∗ -12.76∗∗∗
(2.40) (0.52) (0.57) (0.29) (1.35)
Percentile
1% -0.30 8.32 9.41∗ 4.27 -4.87
(3.41) (6.55) (5.44) (6.08) (13.94)
5% -0.95 7.48∗ 8.66∗∗ 2.60 -8.84
(2.57) (3.92) (3.37) (3.46) (7.87)
10% -1.05 6.82∗∗ 8.03∗∗∗ 1.61 -9.66
(2.26) (2.99) (2.57) (2.28) (5.89)
25% -1.16 6.34∗∗∗ 7.16∗∗∗ 0.26 -10.79∗∗∗
(1.94) (1.68) (1.41) (1.03) (3.79)
50% -1.19 7.61∗∗∗ 8.27∗∗∗ -0.67 -12.88∗∗∗
(2.14) (0.87) (0.83) (0.51) (2.42)
75% -0.25 8.24∗∗∗ 9.29∗∗∗ 0.13 -13.27∗∗∗
(2.43) (0.56) (0.70) (0.24) (1.54)
90% 0.16 8.40∗∗∗ 8.82∗∗∗ 1.42∗∗∗ -13.18∗∗∗
(2.50) (0.38) (0.52) (0.18) (0.91)
95% 0.50 8.16∗∗∗ 8.38∗∗∗ 2.24∗∗∗ -12.84∗∗∗
(2.60) (0.35) (0.48) (0.20) (0.72)
99% 1.24 8.18∗∗∗ 6.90∗∗∗ 3.12∗∗∗ -12.23∗∗∗
(2.70) (0.43) (0.49) (0.31) (0.57)
Note: (a) Percentage change in accumulated assets with respect to default investment
path. (b) Bootstrapped standard errors are in parentheses using with 100 draws.
∗ Significant at the 10 percent level; ∗∗ 5 percent level; ∗∗∗ 1 percent level.
7.2 An Increase in Required Contributions
Currently every worker is required to contribute 10 percent of her salary into their retirement
account. It has been suggested that this contribution rate may not be enough for retirement. Policy
makers are discussing increasing the contributory rate. I simulate four different scenarios in which
individuals are required to contribute 11, 13, 15, and 20 percent of their wages and compute the
gains in retirement wealth. Table 7.3 presents the change in accumulated assets under these policies.
These are relevant results for policy makers as even small increases in the contribution rate generate
important differences in asset accumulation. An increase of the contribution rate in 1 percent
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generates significant increases of 3.21 percent at the mean, with bigger effects in the first quartile.
An increasing the mandatory contributions of 3 and 5 percent generate on average a statistically
significant increase of 9.64 and 16.09 percent, respectively (1.32 and 2.15 percent real per year,
respectively).
Table 7.3: Effect of Contribution Rate: Percentage Change in Accumulated Assets at the End of
Seven Years under Different Mandatory Contribution Schedules
Mandatory Contribution Schedule
α = 11% α = 13% α = 15% α = 20%
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Mean 3.21∗∗∗ 9.64∗∗∗ 16.09∗∗∗ 32.25∗∗∗
(0.46) (1.38) (2.31) (4.64)
Percentile
1% 7.82∗∗∗ 23.05∗ 37.86∗∗∗ 69.17∗∗∗
(2.41) (7.40) (12.62) (26.14)
5% 7.60∗∗∗ 22.19∗∗∗ 36.57∗∗∗ 70.34∗∗∗
(0.97) (3.09) (5.42) (11.72)
10% 7.83∗∗∗ 22.93∗∗∗ 37.75∗∗∗ 72.83∗∗∗
(0.81) (2.56) (4.43) (9.53)
25% 7.51∗∗∗ 22.21∗∗∗ 36.56∗∗∗ 71.48∗∗∗
(0.50) (1.57) (2.72) (5.89)
50% 5.52∗∗∗ 16.33∗∗∗ 26.96∗∗∗ 53.31∗∗∗
(0.48) (1.42) (2.36) (4.72)
75% 3.65∗∗∗ 10.97∗∗∗ 18.32∗∗∗ 36.57∗∗∗
(0.54) (1.59) (2.61) (5.07)
90% 2.09∗∗∗ 6.42∗∗∗ 10.96∗∗∗ 23.11∗∗∗
(0.43) (1.31) (2.24) (4.69)
95% 1.65∗∗∗ 4.99∗∗∗ 8.42∗∗∗ 17.43∗∗∗
(0.34) (1.05) (1.80) (3.82)
99% 1.06∗∗∗ 3.33∗∗∗ 5.61∗∗∗ 11.66∗∗∗
(0.25) (0.76) (1.28) (2.66)
Note: (a) Percentage change in accumulated assets with respect to
the baseline simulation (α = 10%). (b) Bootstrapped standard errors
are in parentheses using with 100 draws.
∗ Significant at the 10 percent level; ∗∗ 5 percent level; ∗∗∗ 1 percent
level.
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7.3 Impact of Increased Part-time Employment among Women
In this scenario every women with children who is not working, is simulated to hold a part-time
job. An issue of relevance for policy makers is the wealth-loss of woman who exit the labor
market after having children. This wealth-loss directly impacts their retirement income. With no
treatment, total part-time employers represents 3.03 percent of the total sample and 4.26 percent
of the female sample. From this treatment, after 7 years, total part-time employment increases by
9.48 percent and female part-time employment increases by 20.49 percent (e.g., 20.49 percent of
women were simulated to be working part-time). The simulation results are presented in Table 7.4.
On average, there is a statistically significant increase of 1.02 percent in asset accumulation for the
total population including men and women in the system and a statistically significant increase of
9.54 percent for women in the treatment group.
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Table 7.4: Percentage Change in Accumulated Assets at the End of Seven Years of Increased
Part-time Employment Among Women
Fixing Mothers to Work
Part-Time when Not-employed
Total All Women Women in Men
treatment
Mean 1.02∗ 3.33 9.54∗∗∗ –
(0.56) (2.05) (3.48)
Percentile
1% 56.08 62.86 333.29 –
(41.08) (73.94) (435.83)
5% 32.56 58.33 120.82 –
(23.50) (44.36) (96.77)
10% 16.78 38.73 70.80 –
(14.21) (32.00) (48.99)
25% 5.23 16.18 31.24∗ –
(4.13) (13.71) (18.44)
50% 1.45 6.61 15.32∗∗ –
(0.89) (4.75) (7.01)
75% 0.38 ∗ 2.43 7.82∗∗∗ –
(0.22) (1.72) (2.84)
90% 0.15 0.69 4.55∗∗∗ –
(0.09) (0.57) (1.44)
95% 0.05 0.39 2.72∗∗∗ –
(0.07) (0.31) (0.92)
99% -0.04 0.08 1.97∗∗∗ –
(0.07) (0.12) (0.65)
Note: (a) Percentage change in accumulated assets with respect
to the baseline simulation. (b) Bootstrapped standard errors are
in parentheses using with 100 draws.
∗ Significant at the 10 percent level; ∗∗ 5 percent level; ∗∗∗ 1
percent level.
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7.4 Effect of Family Characteristics on Asset Accumulation
I compare asset accumulation under different family characteristics to test the impact that they
have in explaining retirement disparities. I compare three alternative scenarios: (1) every individual
is married in the first period, compared with respect to observed initial values; (2) every individual is
permanently married starting at period 2, compared with respect with being permanently single; and
(3) every individual is first observed with an additional children, compared with respect to observed
initial values. These results may be relevant for the design and evaluation of policy instruments that
attempt to ameliorate retirement income disparities.2 Table 7.5 presents the results for the family
characteristics simulation.
Wealth accumulation increases by 0.64 and 2.66 percent when the individual is initially or
permanently married, respectively. An additional child in the first period has a significant negative
effect on asset accumulation for the lowest percentile of the asset distribution.
2For instance, the “bonus per child” (named bono por hijo) was introduced in Chile for providing extra savings for
retirement to women with children.
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Table 7.5: Effect of Family Characteristics: Percentage Change in Accumulated Assets at the End
of Seven Years
Marital Status Number of Children
Married Permanently Additional
at t = 1 Married Children at t = 1
(1) (2) (3)
Mean 0.64∗∗∗ 2.66∗∗∗ -0.12
(0.16) (0.61) (0.16)
Percentile
1% -4.14∗ -14.94∗∗ -5.43∗∗
(2.21) (7.25) (2.31)
5% -2.30 -7.06 -3.41∗∗
(1.55) (4.87) (1.33)
10% -0.57 -1.23 -2.10∗∗
(1.13) (3.65) (0.93)
25% 1.33∗∗ 4.61∗∗∗ -0.60
(0.53) (1.73) (0.49)
50% 1.41∗∗∗ 4.62∗∗∗ -0.18
(0.30) (0.93) (0.31)
75% 0.82∗∗∗ 3.48∗∗∗ -0.04
(0.16) (0.69) (0.18)
90% 0.34∗∗∗ 2.02∗∗∗ -0.02
(0.09) (0.51) (0.10)
95% 0.27∗∗∗ 1.71∗∗∗ 0.02
(0.08) (0.43) (0.08)
99% 0.10∗ 1.46∗∗∗ 0.01
(0.06) (0.34) (0.08)
Note: (a) For column 1 and 3 percentage change in accumulated assets
with respect to the baseline simulation. For column 2 percentage
change in accumulated assets of being permanently married versus
being permanently single. (b) Permanently married starting at year
2. (c) Bootstrapped standard errors are in parentheses using with 100
draws.
∗ Significant at the 10 percent level; ∗∗ 5 percent level; ∗∗∗ 1 percent
level.
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7.5 Effect of Health Characteristics on Asset Accumulation
I compare asset accumulation under different health characteristics. Two analysis are simulated:
(1) an initial improvement in the individual health status and (2) a permanent improvement in health
status during the 7 years starting the first period. Asset accumulation increases by 0.48 and 2.57
percent for an initial and permanent improvement in health status, respectively. Table 7.6 presents
the results for the health characteristics simulation.
Table 7.6: Effect of Health Characteristics: Percentage Change in Accumulated Assets at the End of
Seven Years
Initial Permanent
Improvement in Improvement in
Health Status Health Status
(1) (2)
Mean 0.48∗∗∗ 2.57∗∗∗
(0.12) (0.78)
Percentile
1% 3.18∗∗∗ 4.56
(0.70) (3.58)
5% 2.77∗∗∗ 5.90∗
(0.44) (3.30)
10% 2.26∗∗∗ 6.79∗∗
(0.36) (2.95)
25% 1.52∗∗∗ 6.67∗∗∗
(0.28) (2.00)
50% 0.81∗∗∗ 4.26∗∗∗
(0.19) (1.25)
75% 0.43∗∗∗ 2.73∗∗∗
(0.13) (0.84)
90% 0.28∗∗∗ 1.77∗∗∗
(0.10) (0.57)
95% 0.22∗∗ 1.34∗∗∗
(0.09) (0.49)
99% 0.06 0.81∗∗
(0.06) (0.36)
Note: (a) Percentage change in accumulated assets with
respect to the baseline simulation. (b) Bootstrapped
standard errors are in parentheses using with 100 draws.
∗ Significant at the 10 percent level; ∗∗ 5 percent level;
∗∗∗ 1 percent level.
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7.6 Policy Simulations for Alternative Specifications of the Model
I compare these simulation results with the ones obtained using the alternative specifications of
the model. In particular, I use the model with no correlated unobserved heterogeneity (model 1)
and the model in which subjective assessments are included as exogenous explanatory variables
and no correlated unobserved heterogeneity is allowed (model 6) as the data-generating process
for 7 years to run the same policy simulations. At the mean, the simulations for the alternative
default investment schemes are stable across models, while the difference for policies than increase
contributory rates and for policies that promote part-time jobs to currently not-employed women with
children are substantially. Differences are also considerably for the effect of family characteristics.
These results are available from the author.
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CHAPTER 8
CONCLUSION
In this dissertation I propose a dynamic model of individual lifetime behavior and jointly estimate
a set of correlated dynamic equations for observed risk aversion, wealth-related decisions, and
other characteristics that an individual may value independently of wealth. I compare the estimated
marginal effects of policy variables of interest, in the framework of a contributory retirement system,
when these observed measures of risk aversion are excluded from empirical models, or exogenously
or endogenously included. I also reconcile the use of these observed measures with the economic
theory of behavior over time. I use the first four waves of the Chilean Survey of Social Protection
(2002-2009) complemented with administrative data of the Chilean Superintendence of Pensions.
The model is used to simulate policies with the objective of increasing individuals retirement
income.
I find that there is correlation, through unobserved characteristics between risk aversion and
wealth-related decisions. By jointly estimating observed risk aversion and decisions and outcomes,
I reduce the bias on the estimated marginal effects of variables of policy interest and better ap-
proximate the distribution of the remaining individual unobserved heterogeneity. The evidence
that the unobserved determinants of observed measures of risk aversion and individual behaviors
and outcomes are correlated suggests that empirical models that treat observed risk aversion as an
exogenous covariate are incorrectly specified.
I propose alternative time-varying investment schemes and simulate wealth accumulation under
these regimes. I show that slightly riskier investment strategies may increase asset accumulation
by 8 percent or more over seven years, or 1.1 percent per year. Other policy simulations show
that increasing mandatory contribution rates by 3 and 5 percent generates statistically significant
increases in asset accumulation of 10 and 16 percent over the same period of time. Allowing women
with children who are currently not employed to hold a part-time job, generate a mean significant
increase by 10 percent in asset accumulation for the treated women, over 7 years. It is found that
other characteristics such as health status and family characteristics also have a significant effect on
wealth accumulation.
There are some extensions of the work done in this dissertation in order to analyze in greater
detail retirement income. One extension consists of incorporating empirical measures that capture
individual knowledge about the retirement system, information available in EPS. This knowledge
should impact investments decisions and asset accumulation and it is likely correlated with other
behaviors. The inclusion of this information may help to get neater effects. A second possible
extension is to incorporate objective measures of expected duration of life from insurance markets
and compare how close they are to the individuals’ subjective measures. The objective measures are
the ones being used for computing pensions and retirement incomes after an individual retires. With
this extension, it is possible to understand how policy instruments affect individuals’ investment
decisions and how they impact wealth accumulation and retirement income.
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APPENDIX A
APPENDIX FOR THE DERIVATION OF BOMMIER AND ROCHET’S DYNAMIC MEASURE
OF RISK AVERSION (SIMPLIFIED VERSION OF THE MODEL)
Let the per-period utility function Ut = U(ct, lt; t, r∗t ) depend on consumption (ct) and leisure
(lt). Assume Ut is twice continuously differentiable. t denotes a preference error and r∗t the
curvature of the per-period utility function. Assume there is only one asset which generates a
return of Rt in period t + 1 and unknown at t. At−1 denotes wealth entering period t while at is
the investment decision in t that takes the form of a fraction α of labor income invested. That
is, at = αwtht where wt denotes hourly wage and ht hours worked. Future wage is unknown
for the individual at period t. The monetary value of assets (or wealth) evolve according to:
At = (1 + Rt−1)At−1 + at. The individual faces a time constraint Γt = lt + ht and a budget
constraint ct + at = wtht + At−1Rt−1. I denote the lifetime utility function as Vt.
Using this simple framework I present the measures of true risk aversion for a one period model
and for a two period model with and with no uncertainty. True risk aversion changes as one includes
more periods as it depend on the curvature of the per-period utility function and future discounted
utility.
A.1 One Period Model with No Uncertainty
The static absolute, A(At−1), and relative, R(At−1), measures of risk aversion are:
A(At−1) = −
 ddAt−1
(
dU(ct,lt;r∗t )
dct
dct
dAt−1
)
dU(ct,lt;r∗t )
dct
dct
dAt−1
 = −r∗t
R(At−1) = −At−1
 ddAt−1
(
dU(ct,lt;r∗t )
dct
dct
dAt−1
)
dU(ct,lt;r∗t )
dct
dct
dAt−1
 = −At−1 · r∗t
If U(·) takes a CRRA representation, then r∗t = ρ.
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A.2 Two-period Model With No Uncertainty
For simplicity assume first that there is no uncertainty about the preference errors, wages, and
investment return. The discounted lifetime utility function is:
Vt = U(ct, lt; r
∗
t ) + βmax
d
U(ct+1, lt+1; r
∗
t+1|ct, lt)
where β is the discount factor and d represents the consumption and savings decision. Or, alterna-
tively, after replacing constraints,
Vt = U(wtht + At−1Rt−1 − αwtht, lt; r∗t )+
βmax
d
U(wt+1ht+1 + ((1 +Rt−1)At−1 + at)Rt − αwt+1ht+1, lt+1; r∗t+1|ct, lt).
The absolute, AD(At−1), and relative, RD(At−1), versions of the dynamic measures of risk aversion
are:
AD(At−1) = −
 ddAt−1
(
dU(ct,lt;r∗t )
dct
dct
dAt−1
)
+ β d
dAt−1
(
dmaxd U(ct+1,lt+1;r
∗
t+1|ct,lt)
dct
dct
dAt−1
)
dU(ct,lt;r∗t )
dct
dct
dAt−1
+ β
(
dmaxd U(ct+1,lt+1;r
∗
t+1|ct,lt)
dct
dct
dAt−1
)

RD(At−1) = −At−1
 ddAt−1
(
dU(ct,lt;r∗t )
dct
dct
dAt−1
)
+ β d
dAt−1
(
dmaxd U(ct+1,lt+1;r
∗
t+1|ct,lt)
dct
dct
dAt−1
)
dU(ct,lt;r∗t )
dct
dct
dAt−1
+ β
(
dmaxd U(ct+1,lt+1;r
∗
t+1|ct,lt)
dct
dct
dAt−1
)

A.3 Two-period Model with Uncertainty
When we allow the future preference error, wages, and returns to be stochastic, the discounted
lifetime utility function is:
Vt = U(ct, lt; t, r
∗
t ) + β
∫
Rt+1
∫
wt+1
∫
t+1
{
max
d
U(ct+1, lt+1; t+1, r
∗
t+1|ct, lt)
}
dF (t+1)dF (wt+1)dF (Rt+1)
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where df(t+1), dF (wt+1) and dF (Rt+1) are probability density functions over t+1, wt+1 and Rt+1,
respectively. For simplifying the notation I define the operator Et+1 to represent expectations over
t+1, wt+1, and Rt+1. The absolute, AD(At−1), and relative, RD(At−1), versions of the dynamic
measures of risk aversion are:
AD(At−1) = −

d
dAt−1
(
dU(ct,lt;r∗t )
dct
dct
dAt−1
)
+ β d
dAt−1
(
dEt+1{maxd U(ct+1,lt+1;r∗t+1|ct,lt)}
dct
dct
dAt−1
)
dU(ct,lt;r∗t )
dct
dct
dAt−1
+ β
(
dEt+1{maxd U(ct+1,lt+1;r∗t+1|ct,lt)}
dct
dct
dAt−1
)

RD(At−1) = −At−1

d
dAt−1
(
dU(ct,lt;r∗t )
dct
dct
dAt−1
)
+ β d
dAt−1
(
dEt+1{maxd U(ct+1,lt+1;r∗t+1|ct,lt)}
dct
dct
dAt−1
)
dU(ct,lt;r∗t )
dct
dct
dAt−1
+ β
(
dEt+1{maxd U(ct+1,lt+1;r∗t+1|ct,lt)}
dct
dct
dAt−1
)

A.4 Three-period Model with Uncertainty
The discounted lifetime utility function is:
Vt =U(ct, lt; t)+
β
∫
Rt+1
∫
wt+1
∫
t+1
{
max
dt
〈
U(ct+1, lt+1; t+1, r
∗
t+1|ct, lt)+
β
∫
Rt+2
∫
wt+2
∫
t+2
{
max
dt+1
〈
U(ct+2, lt+2; t+2, r
∗
t+2|ct+1, lt+1)
〉}
dt+2dwt+2dRt+2
〉}
dt+1dwt+1dRt+1
The absolute, AD(At−1), and relative, RD(At−1), versions of the dynamic measures of risk aversion
are:
AD(At−1) = −
 dAt−1
(
dU(ct,lt;t,r∗t )
dct
dct
dAt−1
)
+ β d
At−1
(
Et+1{•}
dct
dct
dAt−1
)
dU(ct,lt;t,r∗t )
dct
dct
dAt−1
+ β Et+1{•}
dct
dct
dAt−1

RD(At−1) = −At−1
 dAt−1
(
dU(ct,lt;t,r∗t )
dct
dct
dAt−1
)
+ β d
At−1
(
Et+1{•}
dct
dct
dAt−1
)
dU(ct,lt;t,r∗t )
dct
dct
dAt−1
+ β Et+1{•}
dct
dct
dAt−1

where Et+1 denotes expectations over t+1, kt+1, and wt+1.1
1• represents the term:
maxd
〈
U(ct+1, lt+1; t+1, r
∗
t+1|ct, lt) + βEt+2
{
maxd
〈
U(ct+2, lt+2; t+2, r
∗
t+2|ct+1, lt+1)
〉}〉
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A.5 T-period Model with Uncertainty
The derivation of the dynamic versions of the absolute and relative measure of risk aversion
from A.4 hold with T where Et+1 {•} becomes:
Et+1 {•} = Et+1
{〈
max
dt+1
U(ct+1, lt+1; t+1, r
∗
t+1|ct, lt)+
βEt+2
{
max
dt+2
〈
U(ct+2, lt+2; t+2, r
∗
t+2|ct+1, lt+1)
+ βEt+3
{
max
dt+3
〈
...+ βET
{
max
dT
〈U(cT , lT ; T , r∗T |cT−1, lT−1)〉
}〉}〉}〉}
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APPENDIX B
DATA APPENDIX
B.1 Construction of Elicited Risk Aversion
Individuals are classified into a category of elicited risk aversion based on their answers to three
hypothetical gambles. The questions asked in EPS follow.1
The first question asks:
Suppose that you are the only income earner in the household. You need to choose
between two jobs. Which option do you prefer? (Option A) a job with a lifetime-stable
and certain salary or (Option B) a job where you have the same chances of doubling
your lifetime income or earning only 1/4 of your lifetime income.
If the answer to the question is “option A”, the interviewer continues.
Now what do you prefer? (Option A) a job with a lifetime-stable and certain salary
or (Option B) a job where you have the same chances of doubling your lifetime income
or earning only half of your lifetime income.
The least risk averse categories comes directly from question 1. Elicited risk aversion equals 3
for individuals who selected “option B” in the first question. If the individual chooses “option A” in
the first question, the index of risk aversion is constructed using the second question. Individuals
who chose “option B” in the second question belong to the second category (elicited risk aversion
of 2), and individuals who chose “option A” in the second question belong to the most risk averse
category as individuals assigned to this category exhibited that they are not willing to accept any
gamble (elicited risk aversion equals 1).
In the first wave, instead of “earning only 1/4 of your lifetime income” for the first question,
the survey proposes “decreasing up to 75%.” The second question is asked to every individual
regardless of the previous answer. For constructing the risk attitude index, this category is created
only for those individuals who answered “option A” in the first question
1The questions presented in this chapter where translated from their original wording in Spanish.
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The change in the wording between the first wave and the subsequent ones potentially leads to
measurement error bias. Although mathematically the questions in every wave are equivalent and
therefore also the elicited measures of risk aversion, some argue that there could be a bias in the
answer as individuals could have different aversions to loss (Kahneman and Tversky 1979). This
does not present an issue for this research since the first wave is only used to set the initial conditions
and elicited risk aversion from the first wave does not enter the model. There is one specification of
the estimated model in which initial elicited risk aversion (from the first wave) is jointly estimated
with the system and it enters as an explanatory variable in the per-period decision in the second
wave. This specification accounts among other potential sources of bias, for measurement error.
B.2 Definition of Variables
Employment category (et): 0 = non-employed, 1 = working part-time, and 2 = working
full-time. Full-and part-time categories depend on the reported weekly hours typically worked
in period t. More than 20 hours a week is considered full-time.
Occupation category (ot): {1, 2, ..., 6} based on a regrouping of the 1-digit ISCO classifica-
tion in period t. 1 = Elementary occupations, 2 = Legislators, senior officials and managers,
professionals, technicians and associate professionals. 3 = Clerical support workers. 4 =
Service and sales workers. 5 = Skilled agricultural, forestry and fishery workers, craft and
related trade workers. 6 = Plant and machine operators and assemblers.
Investment category (it): This is a set of five variables: (iAt , iBt , iCt , iDt , iEt ). Each of these
variables take 1 of 2 values, {0, 1}, where 0 represents no investment in that account and 1
represents investment in that account. It is based on all the investment options that an individ-
ual affiliated with the retirement system in Chile has. Each variable reflects participation in
each of the available accounts. Participation in account A is represented by iAt and it is the
riskier account. participation in account B is represented by iCt , in C by i
C
t , in D by i
D
t , and in
E, the safest investment, by iEt . The retirement system offers five accounts (A, B, C, D, E).
An individual may chose to invest in one or in two accounts. The 5 different accounts where
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introduced in August of 2002. Before that there where 2 accounts (Account C, and Account
E). Account E was introduced in May of 2000 and Account C was the only account since
December of 1980 until the introduction of the new ones. When the individual did not report
a fund, the legal default account, according to the individual’s gender and age, was assigned.
Optional savings (st): Dichotomous variable that takes the value 1 if an individual reports to
have any optional savings in period t and 0 otherwise.
Accumulated required assets (Art ): Amount of private savings accumulated in the retirement
system. Computed from Administrative data from the Superintendence of Pensions, based on
investing 10% of individual’s wage every month, in the account of choice reported in EPS
from 2002 onwards. When the individual did not report a fund, the legal default account,
according to the individual’s gender and age, was assigned. Between May of 2000 and August
of 2002, when two accounts are available, investments are accumulated using the mean return
of the two accounts. In thousand of dollars of 2009.
Work experience (Et): Years of labor experience since 1980.
Wage (wt): Hourly wage, measured by the reported after taxes (and legal deductions) monthly
wage divided by 4 times the reported weekly hours typically worked. In 2009 dollars.
Marital status (mt): Takes 1 if the individual reports to be married in period t and 0
otherwise.
Marital history (Mt): May include lagged marital state, number of marriages and cohabita-
tions, and duration of most recent marriage state.
Changes in number of children (nt): Takes 1 of 3 values which represent changes in the
total number of children of 18 years-old or younger in period t (total number refers to children
in and outside the household). 0 = no change in the number of children, -1 = decrease in the
number of children, 1 = increase in the number of children.
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Children history (Nt): May include birth last period, total number of children and ages of
each child.
Number of medical visits (kt): Reported number of medical visits of the individual in period
t.
Health status (Ht): Takes 1 of 4 values, {1, ..., 4} where 1 = very good, 2 = good, 3 = fair, 4
= poor.
Expected Duration of Life (T et ): Reported expected duration of life in years (reported
expected age of death) at the beginning of period t.
Elicited Risk Aversion (rt): Takes 1 of 3 values based on the answers to hypothetical
gambles. 1 being the most risk averse category and 3 the least risk averse category. At the
beginning of period t.
Other individual characteristics (Xt):
Age: Age from administrative data.
Gender: Gender from administrative data.
Education: Education category. It takes four categories: Less than High School, High
School, Technical College, and College and Some Post College.
Region of residence: Set of dummy variables based on the reported region of residence.
Using the old Chilean administrative division which labels regions from 1 to 13 for 2002,
2004, and 2006. Using the new Chilean administrative division which labels region
from 1 to 15 for 2009. Used for geographical classification for exclusion restrictions.
When region of residence is missing, region of place of work if working is used.
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Other variables:
Market characteristics (Zt):
ZEt : Unemployment rate by region of residence.
ZMt : Number of marriages in a year per 1,000 people by region of residence.
ZNt : Mean college tuition in 2009 dollars by region of residence.
ZKt : Number of beds available per 1,000 people of residence, Number of medical
doctors available per 1,000 people by region of residence.
ZHt : Inches of rainfall in a year by region of residence.
Time trend: 0 in 2002, 2 in 2004, 4 in 2006, and 7 in 2009.
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APPENDIX C
APPENDIX FOR ADDITIONAL TABLES FROM ESTIMATION RESULTS
Table C.1: Joint Significance Test for Market Level Exogenous Characteristics in Behavioral and
Subjective Assessments Equations
Equation All Market Level Exogenous Characteristics
(jointly tested)
Employment at t ∗∗∗ p-value= 0.000
Occupation at t ∗∗∗ p-value= 0.000
Investment in A at t ∗∗∗ p-value= 0.000
Investment in B at t p-value= 0.120
Investment in C at t ∗∗∗ p-value= 0.000
Investment in D at t ∗ p-value= 0.054
Investment in E at t ∗∗∗ p-value= 0.000
Savings at t ∗∗∗ p-value= 0.000
Duration of Life at t ∗∗∗ p-value= 0.000
Elicited Risk Aversion at t ∗∗∗ p-value= 0.000
∗ Significant at the 10 percent level.
∗∗ Significant at the 5 percent level.
∗∗∗ Significant at the 1 percent level.
77
Ta
bl
e
C
.2
:S
ig
ni
fic
an
ce
Te
st
fo
rL
ag
ge
d
M
ar
ke
tL
ev
el
E
xo
ge
no
us
C
ha
ra
ct
er
is
tic
s
in
B
eh
av
io
ra
la
nd
Su
bj
ec
tiv
e
A
ss
es
sm
en
ts
E
qu
at
io
ns
E
qu
at
io
n
L
ag
ge
d
M
ar
ke
tL
ev
el
E
xo
ge
no
us
C
ha
ra
ct
er
is
tic
s
(a
tt
−
1)
U
ne
m
pl
oy
m
en
t
H
os
pi
ta
l
N
um
be
ro
f
N
um
be
ro
f
R
ai
nf
al
l
C
ol
le
ge
R
at
e
B
ed
s
D
oc
to
rs
M
ar
ri
ag
es
Tu
iti
on
E
m
pl
oy
m
en
ta
tt
∗∗
N
ot
Si
g
∗∗
∗
∗∗
∗
∗
N
ot
Si
g
O
cc
up
at
io
n
at
t
∗∗
∗
N
ot
Si
g
∗∗
∗
∗∗
∗
∗∗
∗
∗∗
∗
In
ve
st
m
en
ti
n
A
at
t
N
ot
Si
g
N
ot
Si
g
∗∗
∗∗
∗
∗∗
∗
N
ot
Si
g
In
ve
st
m
en
ti
n
B
at
t
N
ot
Si
g
N
ot
Si
g
N
ot
Si
g
N
ot
Si
g
N
ot
Si
g
∗∗
∗
In
ve
st
m
en
ti
n
C
at
t
N
ot
Si
g
N
ot
Si
g
∗∗
∗∗
∗
∗∗
∗
N
ot
Si
g
In
ve
st
m
en
ti
n
D
at
t
N
ot
Si
g
N
ot
Si
g
N
ot
Si
g
N
ot
Si
g
N
ot
Si
g
N
ot
Si
g
In
ve
st
m
en
ti
n
E
at
t
N
ot
Si
g
N
ot
Si
g
∗∗
∗
N
ot
Si
g
N
ot
Si
g
N
ot
Si
g
Sa
vi
ng
s
at
t
∗∗
N
ot
Si
g
N
ot
Si
g
N
ot
Si
g
N
ot
Si
g
∗∗
∗
D
ur
at
io
n
of
L
if
e
at
t
∗∗
N
ot
Si
g
N
ot
Si
g
N
ot
Si
g
N
ot
Si
g
N
ot
Si
g
E
lic
ite
d
R
is
k
A
ve
rs
io
n
at
t
∗∗
∗∗
∗∗
∗
∗∗
N
ot
Si
g
∗∗
∗
Si
gn
ifi
ca
nt
at
th
e
10
pe
rc
en
tl
ev
el
.
∗∗
Si
gn
ifi
ca
nt
at
th
e
5
pe
rc
en
tl
ev
el
.
∗∗
∗
Si
gn
ifi
ca
nt
at
th
e
1
pe
rc
en
tl
ev
el
.
78
Table C.3: Estimation Results for Preferred Model: Multinomial Logit on Employment Status
(relative to work full-time)
Variable Part-Time Not Working
Coeff. St.Er. Coeff. St.Er.
Work Experience -0.065 0.021∗∗∗ -0.078 0.011∗∗∗
Experience Squared 0.001 0.001 -0.001 0.000∗∗∗
Inv in A in t− 1 -0.164 0.340 -0.077 0.098
Inv in B in t− 1 -0.089 0.293 -0.100 0.081
Inv in C in t− 1 -0.093 0.311 -0.100 0.079
Inv in D in t− 1 -0.043 0.325 0.051 0.094
Inv in E in t− 1 0.265 0.483 -0.047 0.139
Assets in t− 1 -0.042 0.006∗∗∗ -0.002 0.002
Savings in t− 1 -0.148 0.097 -0.143 0.049∗∗∗
Marital Status in t− 1 -0.399 0.138∗∗∗ -0.249 0.069∗∗∗
Number of Children -0.052 0.075 -0.078 0.035∗∗
Female-Married 0.519 0.174∗∗∗ 0.698 0.092∗∗∗
Female-Children 0.140 0.085∗ 0.233 0.043∗∗∗
Health: Very good -0.007 0.126 0.003 0.066
Health: Fair 0.083 0.099 0.328 0.050∗∗∗
Health: Poor 0.455 0.172∗∗∗ 1.005 0.088∗∗∗
Age 0.126 0.064∗∗ 0.162 0.029∗∗∗
Age Squared -0.044 0.033 -0.072 0.015∗∗∗
Age Cubic 0.006 0.005 0.014 0.002∗∗∗
Female 0.619 0.147∗∗∗ 0.602 0.077∗∗∗
High School -0.276 0.107∗∗∗ -0.486 0.052∗∗∗
Technical College -0.221 0.168 -1.031 0.093∗∗∗
College -0.106 0.849 -1.581 0.347∗∗∗
Unemployment rate -0.017 0.025 0.033 0.012∗∗∗
Hospital beds 0.201 0.201 -0.087 0.092
Number of doctors 1.174 0.512∗∗ 0.191 0.213
Number of marriages 0.166 0.212 0.272 0.082∗∗∗
Inches of rainfall 0.010 0.004∗∗ 0.006 0.002∗∗∗
College tuition 0.093 0.091 -0.063 0.045
Missing: Children 0.189 0.871 -0.317 0.194
Missing: Education -0.261 0.785 -0.176 0.317
Time trend 0.086 0.066 0.065 0.019∗∗∗
Constant -6.321 0.916∗∗∗ -2.654 0.406∗∗∗
Permanent CUH -0.543 0.258∗∗ -1.229 0.124∗∗∗
Permanent CUH 0.395 0.154∗∗ 0.883 0.091∗∗∗
Permanent CUH -0.499 0.176∗∗∗ -1.399 0.120∗∗∗
Time-varying CUH 0.297 0.140∗∗ 0.028 0.064
Time-varying CUH 0.678 0.310∗∗ 1.637 0.409∗∗∗
Time-varying CUH 0.312 0.177∗ -0.146 0.095
∗ Significant at the 10 percent level.
∗∗ Significant at the 5 percent level.
∗∗∗ Significant at the 1 percent level.
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Table C.6: Estimation Results for Preferred Model: Logit on Savings Decisions (relative to not hold
optional savings)
Variable Coeff. St.Er.
Work Experience -0.007 0.009
Experience Squared 0.000 0.000
Inv in A in t− 1 0.203 0.068∗∗∗
Inv in B in t− 1 0.116 0.056∗∗
Inv in C in t− 1 0.180 0.055∗∗∗
Inv in D in t− 1 0.138 0.071∗
Inv in E in t− 1 0.121 0.103
Assets in t− 1 0.006 0.001∗∗∗
Savings in t− 1 0.825 0.034∗∗∗
Marital Status in t− 1 0.074 0.050
Number of Children 0.001 0.023
Female-Married -0.061 0.070
Female-Children -0.042 0.032
Health: Very good 0.001 0.046
Health: Fair -0.077 0.041∗
Health: Poor -0.201 0.081∗∗
Age -0.061 0.009∗∗∗
Age Squared 0.008 0.002∗∗∗
Female 0.131 0.057∗∗
High School 0.294 0.038∗∗∗
Technical College 0.529 0.057∗∗∗
College 0.893 0.135∗∗∗
Unemployment rate -0.016 0.010∗
Hospital beds 0.049 0.069
Number of doctors 0.152 0.150
Number of marriages 0.037 0.062
Inches of rainfall 0.005 0.002∗∗∗
College tuition 0.043 0.034
Missing: Children -0.071 0.112
Missing: Education 0.665 0.197∗∗∗
Time trend 0.008 0.014
Constant -1.297 0.283∗∗∗
Permanent CUH -0.057 0.059
Permanent CUH -0.356 0.052∗∗∗
Permanent CUH -0.091 0.056
Time-varying CUH 0.042 0.047
Time-varying CUH -0.142 0.113
Time-varying CUH 0.172 0.066∗∗∗
∗ Significant at the 10 percent level.
∗∗ Significant at the 5 percent level.
∗∗∗ Significant at the 1 percent level.
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Table C.7: Estimation Results for Preferred Model: Subjective Assessments
Variable Elicited Risk Aversion Expected Duration
(relative to Most) of Life
Intermediate Least
Coeff. St.Er. Coeff. St.Er. Coeff. St.Er.
Work Experience 0.024 0.015∗ -0.019 0.011∗ 0.018 0.013
Experience Squared -0.001 0.001 0.001 0.000
Inv in A in t− 1 0.098 0.117 0.123 0.084 -0.158 0.503
Inv in B in t− 1 -0.021 0.098 0.002 0.071 0.402 0.357
Inv in C in t− 1 0.072 0.094 -0.028 0.072 0.338 0.361
Inv in D in t− 1 0.052 0.117 -0.044 0.089 0.435 0.539
Inv in E in t− 1 -0.390 0.200∗ -0.026 0.124 0.284 0.685
Assets in t− 1 0.001 0.002 -0.001 0.002 0.005 0.006
Savings in t− 1 0.029 0.060 -0.002 0.042 0.526 0.172∗∗∗
Marital Status in t− 1 0.058 0.080 -0.006 0.055 0.785 0.310∗∗
Number of Children 0.001 0.038 0.016 0.026 0.145 0.108
Female-Married 0.046 0.114 0.062 0.081 -0.766 0.467
Female-Children -0.036 0.054 -0.032 0.037 -0.195 0.151
Health: Very good 0.115 0.076 0.186 0.052∗∗∗ 1.253 0.220∗∗∗
Health: Fair 0.024 0.067 0.046 0.048 -2.485 0.192∗∗∗
Health: Poor -0.176 0.129 -0.075 0.091 -5.987 0.402∗∗∗
Age -0.006 0.005 -0.010 0.003∗∗∗ -0.120 0.042∗∗∗
Age Squared 0.055 0.010∗∗∗
Female -0.090 0.096 -0.370 0.067∗∗∗ -0.657 0.350∗
High School 0.011 0.068 0.109 0.045∗∗ 0.513 0.191∗∗∗
Technical College 0.175 0.102∗ 0.283 0.067∗∗∗ 1.662 0.353∗∗∗
College -0.111 0.613 0.267 0.185 1.735 0.693∗∗
Unemployment rate -0.022 0.016 -0.020 0.011∗ -0.182 0.047∗∗∗
Hospital beds 0.346 0.118∗∗∗ 0.202 0.091∗∗ 0.164 0.431
Number of doctors 0.519 0.295∗ 0.078 0.302 0.942 0.677
Number of marriages -0.281 0.123∗∗ -0.212 0.126∗ -0.867 0.335∗∗∗
Inches of rainfall -0.015 0.003∗∗∗ -0.007 0.002∗∗∗ -0.030 0.009∗∗∗
College tuition 0.077 0.057 0.104 0.045∗∗ 0.328 0.157∗∗
Missing: Children -0.295 0.214 0.106 0.125 0.968 0.556∗
Missing: Education 0.720 0.595 0.423 0.334 0.102 1.000
Time trend 0.045 0.024∗ 0.012 0.020 0.084 0.082
Constant -2.805 0.626∗∗∗ -0.895 0.741 52.038 1.014∗∗∗
Permanent CUH -0.152 0.100 -0.200 0.070∗∗∗ 1.337 0.437∗∗∗
Permanent CUH -0.059 0.085 -0.275 0.062∗∗∗ 0.060 0.367
Permanent CUH 0.081 0.096 0.154 0.064∗∗ 0.222 0.421
Time-varying CUH 0.135 0.079∗ -0.049 0.054 0.135 0.223
Time-varying CUH 0.000 0.170 0.065 0.115 1.281 0.788
Time-varying CUH 0.321 0.108∗∗∗ 0.169 0.074∗∗ 0.276 0.474
∗ Significant at the 10 percent level.
∗∗ Significant at the 5 percent level.
∗∗∗ Significant at the 1 percent level.
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Table C.8: Estimation Results for Preferred Model: Wage equation
Variable Wage (log)
Coeff. St.Er.
Work Experience 0.006 0.003∗
Experience Squared 0.000 0.000
Legislators 0.561 0.022∗∗∗
Clerical 0.339 0.022∗∗∗
Service and Sales 0.118 0.023∗∗∗
Agricultural -0.079 0.023∗∗∗
Plant Operators -0.042 0.021∗∗
Health: Very good 0.060 0.013∗∗∗
Health: Fair -0.107 0.013∗∗∗
Health: Poor -0.196 0.026∗∗∗
Number of Children 0.003 0.007
Marital Status in t− 1 0.092 0.011∗∗∗
Age 0.001 0.001
Female -0.196 0.013∗∗∗
High School 0.257 0.012∗∗∗
Technical College 0.686 0.021∗∗∗
College 0.875 0.040∗∗∗
Missing: Occupation 0.139 0.044∗∗∗
Unemployment rate -0.003 0.003
Missing: Education 0.365 0.059∗∗∗
Missing: Children 0.000 0.031
Constant 0.572 0.039∗∗∗
Permanent CUH -0.263 0.028∗∗∗
Permanent CUH -0.411 0.024∗∗∗
Permanent CUH -0.314 0.029∗∗∗
Time-varying CUH 0.039 0.014∗∗∗
Time-varying CUH -10.294 0.039∗∗∗
Time-varying CUH 0.180 0.019∗∗∗
∗ Significant at the 10 percent level.
∗∗ Significant at the 5 percent level.
∗∗∗ Significant at the 1 percent level.
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Table C.9: Estimation Results for Preferred Model: Marital Status, and Variation in Number of
Children
Variable Marital Status Children variation
(relative to married) (relative to no change)
Decrease Increase
Coeff. St.Er. Coeff. St.Er. Coeff. St.Er.
Duration of marriage -0.025 0.004∗∗∗ 0.066 0.004∗∗∗ -0.098 0.014∗∗∗
Marital Status in t− 1 -4.382 0.106∗∗∗ -1.133 0.115∗∗∗ 0.798 0.195∗∗∗
Number of Children -0.258 0.035∗∗∗ 1.161 0.032∗∗∗ 0.691 0.065∗∗∗
Female-Married -0.097 0.106 -0.316 0.095∗∗∗ -0.076 0.213
Female-Children 0.100 0.048∗∗ 0.177 0.041∗∗∗ -0.035 0.098
Full-Time employed -0.047 0.071 0.297 0.060∗∗∗ 0.554 0.194∗∗∗
Part-Time employed -0.029 0.153 0.254 0.127∗∗ 0.148 0.463
Age 0.063 0.028∗∗ 0.515 0.017∗∗∗ -0.153 0.025∗∗∗
Age Squared -0.037 0.017∗∗ -0.113 0.004∗∗∗ 0.006 0.009
Age Cubic 0.006 0.003∗∗
Female 0.357 0.090∗∗∗ 0.263 0.098∗∗∗ 0.005 0.211
High School 0.016 0.060 -0.078 0.049 0.202 0.118∗
Technical College -0.079 0.092 -0.131 0.080∗ 0.068 0.187
College -0.452 0.159∗∗∗ -0.075 0.127 0.037 0.583
Number of marriages -0.317 0.085∗∗∗
College tuition -0.001 0.039 -0.217 0.087∗∗∗
Missing: Marriage Duration -0.082 0.441 1.595 0.443∗∗∗ -0.026 0.988
Missing: Children -0.641 0.158∗∗∗
Missing: Education -0.374 0.553 0.114 0.426 0.941 0.893
Constant 3.257 0.388∗∗∗ -8.618 0.261∗∗∗ -2.371 0.463∗∗∗
Permanent CUH 0.184 0.093∗∗ -0.107 0.079 -0.053 0.200
Permanent CUH 0.016 0.078 0.041 0.064 -0.112 0.206
Permanent CUH 0.045 0.093 -0.099 0.076 -0.183 0.198
Time-varying CUH 0.015 0.089 -0.011 0.079 -0.199 0.212
Time-varying CUH -1.795 0.352∗∗∗ 0.866 0.319∗∗∗ 3.972 0.439∗∗∗
Time-varying CUH -0.043 0.130 0.254 0.105∗∗ -0.072 0.271
∗ Significant at the 10 percent level.
∗∗ Significant at the 5 percent level.
∗∗∗ Significant at the 1 percent level.
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Table C.10: Estimation Results for Preferred Model: Health Status
Variable Health Status (relative to very good)
Good Regular Poor
Coeff. St.Er. Coeff. St.Er. Coeff. St.Er.
Health: Very good -0.528 0.060∗∗∗ -0.789 0.084∗∗∗ -0.889 0.203∗∗∗
Health: Fair 0.289 0.081∗∗∗ 1.526 0.084∗∗∗ 1.845 0.122∗∗∗
Health: Poor 0.678 0.329∗∗ 2.353 0.322∗∗∗ 4.108 0.333∗∗∗
Number of Medical Visits 0.010 0.003∗∗∗ 0.022 0.004∗∗∗ 0.027 0.004∗∗∗
Work Experience 0.003 0.005 -0.004 0.006 -0.005 0.008
Legislators -0.296 0.142∗∗ -0.442 0.175∗∗ -0.288 0.330
Clerical -0.025 0.143 0.007 0.172 0.282 0.352
Service and Sales 0.011 0.156 -0.090 0.187 0.084 0.322
Agricultural -0.165 0.178 -0.244 0.204 -0.191 0.342
Plant Operators 0.062 0.141 -0.018 0.163 0.208 0.264
Age 0.034 0.014∗∗ 0.084 0.017∗∗∗ 0.163 0.032∗∗∗
Age Squared -0.004 0.003 -0.009 0.004∗∗ -0.021 0.007∗∗∗
Female 0.170 0.064∗∗∗ 0.379 0.075∗∗∗ 0.618 0.115∗∗∗
High School -0.098 0.066 -0.537 0.077∗∗∗ -0.693 0.121∗∗∗
Technical College -0.214 0.105∗∗ -0.924 0.139∗∗∗ -1.301 0.274∗∗∗
College -0.489 0.253∗ -1.445 0.520∗∗∗ -1.873 0.826∗∗
Inches of rainfall 0.001 0.002 0.006 0.002∗∗ 0.003 0.004
Missing: Occupation -0.096 0.327 -0.341 0.438 -0.405 0.691
Missing: Education -0.201 0.492 -0.657 0.712 -0.766 0.922
Not employed 0.123 0.333 0.254 0.448 0.713 0.686
Constant 0.869 0.200∗∗∗ -0.946 0.244∗∗∗ -4.435 0.508∗∗∗
Permanent CUH -0.079 0.139 -0.130 0.168 -0.220 0.294
Permanent CUH 0.072 0.118 0.409 0.136∗∗∗ 0.749 0.206∗∗∗
Permanent CUH 0.075 0.137 0.093 0.169 0.296 0.288
Time-varying CUH -0.068 0.075 -0.055 0.090 0.009 0.150
Time-varying CUH 1.084 1.442 1.105 1.442 1.624 1.670
Time-varying CUH -0.095 0.103 -0.273 0.126∗∗ -0.325 0.210
∗ Significant at the 10 percent level.
∗∗ Significant at the 5 percent level.
∗∗∗ Significant at the 1 percent level.
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Table C.11: Estimation Results for Preferred Model: Medical Care Consumption
Variable Medical Care
Consumption
Coeff. St.Er.
Health: Very good -1.047 0.246∗∗∗
Health: Fair 4.887 0.207∗∗∗
Health: Poor 15.679 0.424∗∗∗
Age -0.048 0.040
Age Squared 0.019 0.009∗∗
Female 4.149 0.177∗∗∗
High School 1.370 0.198∗∗∗
Technical College 2.881 0.378∗∗∗
College 3.974 0.943∗∗∗
Hospital beds -0.038 0.299
Number of doctors 0.550 0.671
Missing: Education 2.248 1.000∗∗
Constant 1.537 0.882∗
Permanent CUH -0.302 0.413
Permanent CUH -0.201 0.480
Permanent CUH -0.657 0.434
Time-varying CUH 0.215 0.340
Time-varying CUH -1.633 0.699∗∗
Time-varying CUH 0.947 0.598
∗ Significant at the 10 percent level.
∗∗ Significant at the 5 percent level.
∗∗∗ Significant at the 1 percent level.
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Table C.12: Pearson’s Correlation Coefficient of Unobserved Heterogeneity Between Subjective
Assessments and Outcomes
Outcome Risk Aversion Expected
Intermediate Least Duration of Life
Perm. Time-Var. Perm. Time-Var. Perm. Time-Var.
Employment (relative to full-time worker)
Part-Time Worker -0.021 0.681 -0.558 -0.014 -0.689 0.765
Not Working -0.092 -0.236 -0.597 0.027 -0.643 0.867
Occupation (relative to elementary occupation)
Legis., Prof., Tech., other 0.626 0.435 0.967 0.794 0.022 0.815
Clerical support workers 0.058 0.527 0.623 0.948 0.626 0.543
Service and sales workers 0.842 0.081 0.829 0.587 -0.244 0.903
Agricultural, craft and trade -0.069 -0.638 -0.558 -0.505 -0.664 0.425
Operators and assemblers 0.506 -0.589 0.612 0.479 -0.474 0.339
Investment Decision
Account A (Riskier) 0.114 0.917 0.682 0.680 0.526 0.407
Account B -0.389 0.610 0.225 -0.465 0.728 0.321
Account C 0.343 -0.984 -0.210 -0.465 -0.909 -0.399
Account D 0.269 -0.067 -0.285 -0.912 -0.492 0.069
Account E (Safest) -0.238 0.838 -0.749 -0.169 -0.279 0.351
Saving Outcomes
Optional Savings 0.222 0.884 0.726 0.432 0.255 -0.151
Elicited Risk Aversion (relative to most risk averse)
Intermediate Risk Averse 1.000 1.000 0.804 0.342 -0.699 0.268
Least Risk Averse 0.804 0.342 1.000 1.000 -0.213 0.300
Marital status
Married -0.675 0.134 -0.209 -0.254 0.997 -0.915
Variation in Number of Children (relative to no change)
Decrease 0.038 0.177 -0.467 0.609 -0.740 0.920
Increase -0.263 -0.240 0.012 0.268 0.041 0.859
Health Status (relative to very good)
Good 0.587 -0.336 0.013 0.188 -0.762 0.812
Regular 0.071 -0.478 -0.529 -0.064 -0.564 0.713
Poor 0.139 -0.369 -0.459 -0.111 -0.561 0.776
Expected Duration of Life -0.699 0.268 -0.213 0.300 1.000 1.000
Log Wage 0.270 0.179 0.573 -0.181 -0.146 -0.899
Medical Consumption -0.236 0.729 -0.277 0.278 -0.314 -0.440
Note: (a) Permanent unobserved heterogeneity also enters the initial condition equations.
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Table C.13: Set of Equations Estimated for each Model and Unobserved Heterogeneity Allowed
Equation Model
1 2 3 4 5* 6 7 8 9 10
Employment (et) X X X X X X X X X X
Occupation (ot) X X X X X X X X X X
Savings (st) X X X X X X X X X X
Investment in A (iAt ) X X X X X X X X X X
Investment in B (iBt ) X X X X X X X X X X
Investment in C (iCt ) X X X X X X X X X X
Investment in D (iDt ) X X X X X X X X X X
Investment in E (iEt ) X X X X X X X X X X
Expected Duration (TEt ) X x x X X x x x X X
Elicited Risk Aversion (rt) X x x X X x x x X X
Log Wage (wt) X X X X X X X X X X
Marital status (mt+1) X X X X X X X X X X
Change in # children (nt+1) X X X X X X X X X X
Medical consumption (kt) X X X X X X X X X X
Health status (Ht+1) X X X X X X X X X X
Initial conditions
Employment X X X X X X X X X X
Work experience X X X X X X X X X X
Occupation X X X X X X X X X X
Savings X X X X X X X X X X
Marital status X X X X X X X X X X
Number of children X X X X X X X X X X
Health status X X X X X X X X X X
Elicited risk aversion x x x x x x x x X X
Expected duration x x x x x x x x X X
Correlated Unobserved Heterogeneity
Permanent NO YES YES YES YES NO YES YES YES YES
(mass points) – (5) (3) (6) (4) – (6) (2) (3) (4)
Time-Varying NO NO YES NO YES NO NO YES NO YES
(mass points) – – (3) – (4) – – (3) – (3)
Note: (a) Model 5* corresponds to the preferred model developed in Chapter 3. (b) A check-mark (X)
means that the equation is included in the system estimated, a cross (x) that it does not. (c) When neither
components of unobserved heterogeneity are allowed, each equation is estimated independently of the rest (no
correlation). (d) Initial conditions equations are correlated solely through permanent unobserved heterogeneity,
when corresponds. (e) The number of mass points are selected according to the sufficient number of points for
capturing the distribution of permanent and time-varying individual heterogeneity.
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Table C.15: Unobserved Heterogeneity Support Points and Probability Weights
Model Permanent CUH Time-Variant CUH
Points of Probability Points of Probability
Support Weights Support Weights
Model 1 – – – –
Model 2 1 0.1280 – –
2 0.2077 – –
3 0.1883 – –
4 0.2791 – –
5 0.1970 – –
Model 3 1 0.4854 1 0.0239
2 0.4392 2 0.4738
3 0.0754 3 0.5023
Model 4 1 0.0686 – –
2 0.4253 – –
3 0.0000 – –
4 0.3026 – –
5 0.1707 – –
6 0.0328 – –
Model 5 1 0.3210 1 0.4218
2 0.1809 2 0.4741
3 0.3472 3 0.0249
4 0.1509 4 0.0793
Model 6 – – – –
Model 7 1 0.1453 – –
2 0.3081 – –
3 0.0297 – –
4 0.1491 – –
5 0.0320 – –
6 0.3358 – –
Model 8 1 0.5158 1 0.4819
2 0.4842 2 0.4440
– – 3 0.0742
Model 9 1 0.4735 – –
2 0.4899 – –
3 0.0366 – –
Model 10 1 0.4474 1 0.0173
2 0.1811 2 0.4055
3 0.3360 3 0.5772
4 0.0355 – –
Note: (a) Model 5 corresponds to the preferred model.
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